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ABSTRACT 
A Metaphysically Neutral Theory of Singular Scientific Explanation 
Michael E. Cuffaro 
Modern philosophical debate on explanation began with Hempel and Oppenheim's 1948 ar-
ticle: Studies in the Logic of Explanation. Hempel and Oppenheim's view: their Deductive-
Nomological model of explanation for deterministic phenomena, and the Inductive-Statistical 
model of explanation for indeterministic phenomena, were for many years the received 
view on the subject. That view has since fallen out of favour, however, and in its wake, 
many alternative models have been proposed. Of these, Peter Railton's Deductive-Nomological-
Probabilistic model represents an exceptionally promising proposal. In this thesis, I argue 
that while we should accept the essentials of Railton's account, we should not endorse it in 
its totality. Railton's account of explanation forces us to ascribe to a hard form of reduc-
tionism. It also forces us to accept a propensity interpretation of probability and a causal 
interpretation of irreducibly indeterministic phenomena. In this thesis I argue that one 
should not have to engage in these metaphysical debates - that an account of explanation 
should be neutral with respect to these issues. 
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Giving a precise account of the nature and purpose of scientific explanation is a chal-
lenge that is about as old as philosophy itself, but modern philosophical debate on expla-
nation began in the 20^ century with Hempel and Oppenheim's Deductive-Nomological 
model of explanation for deterministic phenomena. That model, and Hempel's later Inductive-
Statistical model for indeterministic phenomena, were for many years the received view on 
the subject. On that view, explanations are arguments; the purpose of an explanation is to 
convince one that the fact which it explains follows either deductively or inductively from 
the bulk of our knowledge. 
Hempel and Oppenheim's view has since fallen out of favour, however, and in its 
wake, many alternative models have been proposed. Of these, I believe that Peter Rail-
ton's Deductive-Nomological-Probabilistic model represents an exceptionally promising 
proposal. Railton's conception of explanation is an ontic one; i.e., he holds that a good 
explanation is one that demonstrates the mechanisms and processes which, according to 
our best theories, truly give rise to a phenomenon. One of the many virtues of Railton's 
account is that while it places a strong emphasis on the role of causes in explanations, it 
allows that some explanations may not be causal in nature. I agree, and I will argue that 
any account of explanation must be able to deal with non-causal cases - and that Railton's 
model satisfies this criterion. But while I accept the essentials of Railton's account, I do not 
endorse it in its totality. Railton's account of explanation forces us to ascribe to a hard form 
of reductionism. It also places too much emphasis on the appeal to causes, forcing us to 
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accept a propensity interpretation of probability and a causal interpretation of irreducibly 
indeterministic phenomena. I will argue that one should not have to engage in these meta-
physical debates when giving an account of scientific explanation. Ideally, I will argue, an 
account of explanation should be neutral with respect to these issues. 
I do not believe that these metaphysical issues are either meaningless or unimportant, 
however. I do not believe that metaphysics is nonsense and I do not desire to see it banished 
from philosophy (or even from science). Yet there are times when we must put aside these 
questions. I believe it is possible to give an account of explanation that assumes the answers 
to none of them and that is able to make room for the answers to them all. Railton, although 
himself a realist, has put forth a model of explanation that is capable, in my eyes, of doing 
just this. Yet Railton's realism has intruded too much. Thus I will argue that we should 
accept Railton's model, minus his metaphysics. 
A final note before I begin: as the title of this thesis implies, my focus here will be 
on singular explanation; that is, explanation with regard to singular facts: the collapse of 
a bridge, a car accident, the gravitational pull of the sun, and so on. I will not extend 
my discussion to models, such as those put forward by Friedman, Kitcher, and others, for 
explanations of general regularities (where one or more specific laws are subsumed under 
more general ones).1 I do this merely for lack of space. The subject of scientific explanation 
is a broad one. There is already very much to discuss with regard to singular explanation; 
moreover, I believe that the model of explanation that I present is capable of being extended 
to account for explanations of both singular facts and general regularities. But that is not 
something that I wish to defend in this thesis. 
See, for example, Friedman 1974, Kitcher 1989, for these unificationist accounts of explanation. 
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Chapter 1 
Explanations of Deterministic 
Phenomena 
1.1 The Deductive-Nomological Model 
Law Statements and Theory Statements 
An explanation of a singular fact (e.g., an eclipse of the sun, the salt content of a body 
of water) can be characterized as follows: it consists of a set of sentences subdivided into 
(a) an explanandum statement: a sentence describing the fact to be explained, and (b) an 
explanans: a set of sentences that describe the relevant factors which account for that fact. 
With regard to the explanans, on Hempel and Oppenheim's view it must always include 
at least one 'general law': either a fundamental law, a derivative law, or a theory. We can 
explicate the concept ofa fundamental law in a language L as follows:1 
(7.3a) S is a fundamental lawlike sentence in L if S is purely universal; S is a 
fundamental law in L if S is purely universal and true. 
'Hempel 1965, 272. The numbering here (7.3a, 7.3b, etc.) corresponds to the numbering of definitions 
given in Hempel and Oppenheim's original article. 
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Fundamental lawlike sentences are universally quantified sentences, e.g., of the form: 
(VX)(BX D Cx), for which we impose no restriction on the domain. Fundamental laws, on 
the other hand, are just those fundamental lawlike sentences that are also true. Next, we 
define the concept of a. derivative law in L as follows: 
(7.3b) S is a derivative law in L if (1) S is essentially, but not purely, uni-
versal and (2) there exists a set of fundamental laws in L which has 5 as a 
consequence. 
Derivative laws are universally quantified sentences whose domain is restricted (this is 
what is meant by saying that they are not 'pure'). Newton's laws of motion are examples 
of derivative laws, for they are not valid for very small scales, for very high speeds, or for 
very strong gravitational fields. They are derivable from the fundamental laws, however, so 
they do not lose their law status in L. Thus, 
(7.3c) S is a law in L if it is a fundamental or a derivative law in L. 
Before continuing, let me point out that (7.3a) does not rule out tautologies (i.e., laws 
of inference). While Hempel and Oppenheim require that every explanation has empirical 
import, they do not interpret this requirement so strongly so as to impose it on every state-
ment in the explanans. They require only that the explanans as a whole (in other words, at 
least one of its law statements) has empirical import. 
We come, finally, to what Hempel and Oppenheim call theories:2 
(7.4a) S is a fundamental theory if S is purely generalized and true. 
(7.4b) S is a derivative theory in L if (1) S is essentially, but not purely, gener-
alized and (2) there exists a set of fundamental theories in L which has S as a 
consequence. 
(7.4c) S is a theory in L if it is a fundamental or a derivative theory in L. 
2Jbid, 272. 
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The difference between law sentences and theories is that the latter can include existen-
tial as well as universal quantifiers (sentences such as: (\/x)(3y)(Pxy); e.g., 'every comet 
has a tail').3. 
D-N Arguments 
Explanations, for Hempel and Oppenheim, are arguments. They involve the subsump-
tion of a fact under a law or a set of laws. We call an explanation deductive-nomological 
or 'D-N' when all of the laws involved are deterministic and satisfy requirements 7.3 -
7.4.4 Later, I will consider the case of so-called inductive-statistical, or T-S' explanation 
involving one or more 'statistical' laws,5 but for now I will limit the discussion to the deter-
ministic case. We can represent a D-N explanation, according to Hempel and Oppenheim, 




Here, Ci, C2,..., Ck represent the initial conditions, while L1: L2,..., Lk are our general 
law statements. Together, they form the explanans (the premises). E, the explanandum 
statement (the conclusion of the argument), follows deductively from the explanans.6 It is 
important to note that the general law statements, L1; L2,..., Lk, cannot be omitted from 
an explanation; we do not permit the explanandum statement to follow directly from the 
initial conditions alone.7 More formally, we can put this as follows:8 
3Hempel and Oppenheim do not actually specify if there is a particular order in which the quantifiers need 
to occur. Also, it is an open question whether theories require universal quantifiers at all. See Salmon 1989, 
19, for a discussion of this 
4Cf. Above. 
5A statistical law can be seen as a less stringent version of a law such as: (\/x)(Px D Rx) (See Hempel 
1965,377). Most statistical laws are reducible, at least in principle, to deterministic laws; however, some (the 
laws of quantum mechanics) are widely held to be irreducibly indeterministic. 
6Cf. Hempel 1965,336. 




(7.5) An ordered couple of sentences, (T, C), constitutes a potential explanans 
for a singular sentence E only if 
(1) T is essentially generalized and C is singular 
(2) E is derivable in L from T and C jointly, but not from C alone. 
Finally, we say that a potential explanation is true iff T is a theory (i.e., iff T is also 
true). For example, consider an astronaut on a lunar walk. At time i0> she lets go of a moon 
rock from a height of 3 metres. Now we would like to explain the fact that the rock hits the 





: vt0 = Om/s 
: Arc = 3m 
: M = 7.3477X1022Kg 
: Ax = v0t + \at2 
(the rock is initially at rest) 
(the distance to the ground is 3m) 
(the mass of the moon) 
(the law of universal gravitation) 
(law for motion in one dimension) 
E : The rock hits the ground at time t0 + 3s. 
The Thesis of Structural Identity 
Part of the motivation for representing explanations as arguments is that, for Hempel,10 
explanations should double as potential predictions. Explanations should not only increase 
our understanding of observed phenomena; they should allow us to use that understand-
ing to extend our knowledge to (currently) unobserved phenomena as well. This is what 
Hempel calls the thesis of structural identity. Since explanations are arguments, the ex-
planandum always follows from the explanans. Therefore if we know that the conditions 
and laws explaining the occurrence of some phenomenon obtain, we can use those same 
conditions and laws to predict future occurrences of the phenomenon. For example, the 
explanation of a particular eclipse of the sun can be used to predict future eclipses. Ex-
9Below, I use the universal law of gravitation in order to derive the rock's acceleration, l.Qm/s2, as it 
falls towards the ground (I have omitted the actual derivation). Note that we can ignore the mass of the rock 
in the calculation as it is very small compared with the moon. 
10From now on I will refer exclusively to Hempel; while Oppenheim co-authored their 1948 article, the 
later elaborations and defences of both the D-N and I-S models were due to Hempel alone. 
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planations and predictions are thus symmetrical: an explanation is a potential prediction; a 
prediction (in D-N or I-S form11) is a potential explanation. 
But now consider the following case.12 Imagine a flagpole standing in a field on a 
level stretch of ground. Given its height, along with the current position of the sun and 
the relevant laws of physics, we can use a D-N argument to infer that (and hence explain 
why) it casts a shadow of a particular length. So far, so good; this is a perfectly acceptable 
explanation of the shadow's length, and it is clear that the D-N argument in this case can 
also be used to predict the length of other shadows given similar circumstances. But now 
note that we can also construct a D-N argument inferring the height of the flagpole from 
the length of its shadow.13 But while this argument serves perfectly well for predicting the 
height of the pole (say, if it was obscured somehow), one would likely get strange looks if 
one said that one could explain the height of the flagpole from the length of its shadow. We 
can easily imagine similar examples (e.g., a barometer is good for predicting the weather, 
but one would be hard-pressed to argue that the barometer actually explains the weather). 
What these cases show is that often there is an asymmetrical cause-effect relationship 
between the facts cited in the explanans and the explanandum event, and that in these cases 
it is impossible to transform a D-N prediction into a D-N explanation. I think this objection 
is dead on. However, we should note that it is possible to give Hempel's thesis both a 
strong and a weak reading. Hempel's thesis, in fact, consists of two sub-theses: "... the 
thesis of structural identity amounts to the conjunction of two sub-theses, namely (i) that 
every adequate explanation is potentially a prediction ... (ii) that conversely every adequate 
prediction is potentially an explanation" .u 
What the flagpole example shows is that sub-thesis (ii) is not universally true. Hempel 
is willing to admit this, however, for he writes: "I will argue that the first sub-thesis is 
1
' There is no requirement on predictions that they be given in I-S or D-N form. Hempel allows that some 
predictions can be given on the basis of observation alone without appeal to laws. Cf. Ibid., 368. 
12Cf. Brombergerl969. 
13That is, by switching one of the initial conditions for the explanandum. 
14Hempel 1965, 367. 
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sound, whereas the second one is indeed open to question".15 Now even if sub-thesis (ii) is 
false, I do not think that Hempel loses much. Clearly, sub-thesis (i) is the more important 
of the two: the D-N model is primarily a model of explanation, not of prediction. The 
thesis of structural identity is intended to highlight a certain fact about ideal explanations: 
that they are fruitful, in the sense that they serve to expand our knowledge of unobserved 
phenomena. This is unaffected by the falsity of sub-thesis (ii). As for sub-thesis (i), it 
seems impossible to refute it, for the explanandum-statement is, after all, logically entailed 
by the explanans. Salmon (a vocal critic of Hempel's) concedes this point.16 
Some have argued against sub-thesis (i), however. Scriven, for instance, asks us to con-
sider the case of a collapsed bridge.17 Imagine that upon observing a collapsed bridge, we 
make the following hypothesis: the bridge collapsed either (a) as a result of metal fatigue, 
or (b) as a result of excessive load. Imagine further that it would have been impossible to 
know about the metal fatigue before the actual collapse of the bridge. Now we explain the 
collapse as follows: we know that excessive load was not a factor (the bridge collapsed 
in the middle of the night), and thus it follows that since the bridge did, in fact, collapse, 
that the collapse was caused by metal fatigue. But note that apart from the bridge's actual 
collapse there is no direct evidence that metal fatigue was strong enough to cause it; thus 
we cannot turn this explanation into a (non-circular) prediction. 
But on Hempel's behalf I will say that first, it is stretching things to say that there could 
not have been any evidence of excessive metal fatigue before the actual collapse of the 
bridge. As Hempel writes: "the impossibility appears to be rather a practical and perhaps 
temporary one, reflecting present limitations of knowledge or technology".18 Second, even 
if before the collapse our knowledge was insufficient to predict it, what has been learned 
(by means of an explanation resulting from an investigation into causes of the collapse) can 






that Scriven's counter-example represents a serious challenge to sub-thesis (i). For D-N 
explanations, at least, I conclude we can grant this sub-thesis to Hempel. 
However, there still seems to be something amiss. For to say that some D-N arguments 
are not explanations does not tell us why this is so. Schematically, both versions of the 
flagpole example above are identical; yet one counts as an explanation and one does not. 
A satisfactory account should give us some reason, apart from our intuitions, to distinguish 
between the two. It should give us sufficient, not just necessary, conditions for what counts 
as an explanation. It seems obvious that what is missing in the above cases is some sort 
of causal account. In fact, the problem of asymmetry has led some to assert that what we 
require in explanation is an explicit appeal to causes. For instance, Salmon writes: 
When we come to the second question, regarding temporal asymmetry, we can-
not avoid raising the issue of causation... The time has come, it seems to me, to 
put the "cause" back into "because." Consideration of the temporal asymmetry 
issue forces reconsideration of the role of causation in scientific explanation, 
and of the grounds for insisting that occurrences are to be explained in terms 
of antecedent causes rather than subsequent effects.19 
1.2 Causal Aspects of Explanation 
Salmon is one of a few philosophers of science who hold that explanations must pri-
marily be construed as causal accounts: 'Why did E occur?' 'Because of C".20 Salmon's 
own Causal-Mechanical (C-M) account of explanation is ontic; i.e., he holds that to give an 
''Salmon 1984,96-97. 
20Others are, for instance, Ruben, who actually takes the foregoing sentence as a 'model'; explanations, 
for Ruben, are simply single sentences, of the form 'c is the cause of e' (Ruben, 732). Humphreys 'aleatory' 
view is somewhat similar: 
If one wishes to request an explanation, the canonical form will be: "What is the explanation 
of Y in S at t?" An appropriate explanation will be "Y in S at t [occurred, was present] because 
of $, despite \E"" where 'Y', 'S ' , 't' are terms referring to, respectively, a property or change 
in property, a system, and a time; ' $ ' is a (nonempty) list of terms referring to contributing 
causes of Y; and ' $ ' is a (possibly empty) list of terms referring to counteracting causes of Y 
(Humphreys 1989,287). 
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explanation of a phenomenon is to give a literally true story about the mechanism by which 
a phenomenon arises (which for him is always causal). But if we take an ontic view of 
explanation, and if causality is to play such a crucial role, then we cannot get away without 
explicating the concept of causality. We must either define causality in terms of other, more 
primitive concepts, or else we must show that such a reduction is impossible. We cannot 
just use this concept naively. Salmon, to his credit, does undertake such an analysis. On 
his highly influential account, causality is explicated in terms of causal processes, where a 
causal process is a process that transmits something between two points on its world-line.21 
Examples of causal processes are mass particles, radio waves, photons, even you and I. On 
the original version of Salmon's account, for a process to qualify as genuinely causal it 
must be capable of transmitting a mark. By a 'mark', Salmon means information - a sig-
nal. Thus a piece of paper, for instance, qualifies as a causal process since it is capable of 
transmitting a signal (a letter that I write to you); the radio waves emitted from your local 
FM station are likewise causal processes. We need not limit the examples to these anthro-
pocentric ones: anything that is capable of transmitting a change in its structure from one 
point in its world line to another is a causal process. 
Salmon's inspiration for the mark transmission theory comes from Einstein's special 
theory of relativity, according to which nothing can travel faster than the speed of light in 
a vacuum. What kind of 'thing' we mean in this context needs to be qualified, however, 
for certain 'things' do, in fact, move faster than light. For instance, consider a spotlamp 
rotating, once per second, on its base in the middle of a large stadium. Now the spot that it 
casts on the wall of the stadium does one full circuit of the stadium at exactly the same rate 
as the rate of rotation for the spotlamp (once per second) - and this is independent of the 
stadium's size. If we do the calculation, we will find that when the radius of the stadium is 
approximately 50,000km, the spot moves around the stadium at a rate equal to the speed of 
light. Increase the radius of the stadium yet further, and the spot is now actually travelling 
21
 In physics, the world line of an object is the unique path that something takes through four-dimensional 
spacetime throughout its history. 
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faster than light.22 But this does not amount to a contradiction of special relativity, for 
the precise formulation of that principle is that no signal can travel faster than light. The 
spot on the wall, unlike the beam of light emanating from the spotlamp, cannot transmit 
information. In Salmon's terminology, the spot is a pseudo-process. Now both pseudo-
processes and genuine causal processes have a certain structure; the difference, however, is 
that pseudo-processes are incapable of transmitting this structure from one point on their 
world-line to another. 
Consider, also, the following example of a car and its shadow:23 Salmon asks us to 
imagine a car travelling down the road, with its shadow travelling along with it. Suppose, 
now, that the car hits a wall. After the collision, the car will carry the marks of the collision 
(scratches, dents, etc.) with it. But suppose that only the shadow hits a wall. In this case, the 
shadow will be momentarily deformed, but it will take its former shape again as soon as it 
is clear of the wall. Similarly, suppose I place a large quantity of dynamite into the trunk of 
the car and ignite it; the car will be obliterated; I will have blasted the car out of existence. 
But if just the shadow is obliterated (as the car travels, say, through a dark tunnel), it will 
pop back into existence as soon as the car re-emerges. Now if a causal process is defined as 
one that is capable of transmitting its own structure, then the mark criterion is what enables 
us to differentiate a causal from a pseudo-process. For a mark represents a change in that 
structure. If the mark (dents, scratches, etc.) cannot be transmitted, then neither can the 
structure, and the process cannot be causal. 
But to say that a causal process transmits a mark between two points in its world line 
still leaves us with the question of exactly how this is accomplished. Exactly what does the 
causal relation consist of? Salmon answers this question by appealing to Russell's 'at-at' 
theory of motion, and I quote him at length here: 
22When r = 50,000km, the circumference, I = 2ixr « 314,159fcm. The speed of light is « 
300,000km/s. 
23Cf. Salmon 1984,143-144. 
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How does the mark get from an earlier place in the process to a later one? 
Putting the question in this way suggests a strong analogy. More than 2500 
years ago Zeno of Elea posed the famous paradox of the flying arrow. How 
does the arrow get from point A to point B in its trajectory? ... Early in the 
twentieth century Bertrand Russell offered what is, I believe, a completely sat-
isfactory resolution of the arrow paradox in terms of the so-called at-at theory 
of motion. Motion, Russell observed, is nothing more than a functional rela-
tionship between points of space and moments of time. To move is simply to 
occupy different positions in space at different moments of time. ... To get 
from point A to point B consists merely of being at the intervening points of 
space at the corresponding moments of time. ... There was, it seemed to me, 
a similar answer to the question about mark transmission. A mark that is im-
posed at point A in a process is transmitted to point B in that same process if, 
without additional interventions, the mark is present at each intervening stage 
in the process.24. 
Salmon describes precisely, and at great length, the different types of'interventions', or 
interactions that may occur between processes: interactive forks, perfect forks, conjunctive 
forks, and so on.25 But I will not discuss these here. For our purposes, it will suffice to 
say that an interaction is a joining, in spacetime, of the world lines of two or more causal 
processes that results in a modification of one or more of these processes. For example, the 
collision of the car with the wall will leave modifications, or marks, on both the car and 
the wall that will persist from that moment forward.26 Salmon notes, importantly, that such 
modifications occur "only when (at least) two causal processes intersect. If either or both 
of the intersecting processes are pseudo-processes, no such mutual modification occurs."27 
But there is a (perhaps obvious) objection due to Kitcher regarding Salmon's distinction 
between causal and pseudo-processes.28 Kitcher makes the point that pseudo-processes 
can sometimes transmit pseudo-marks. Imagine the car again. Suppose it is involved in a 
fender-bender. After the accident, the car transmits the property of having a dent. But now 
the shadow, also, from that moment forward transmits the property of being the shadow 
24Salmon 1989,110 
25See Salmon 1984,158-183 for his detailed exposition. 
26
 An intersection of this sort is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for one of the processes to be mod-
ified. It is possible for two causal processes to intersect without the intersection resulting in a modification of 




of a dented car. Also, it seems as though there are many cases in which pseudo-processes 
actually cause modifications in causal processes. Encountering the shadow of a human 
being holding an axe as I walk alone down a dimly lit alleyway late at night, for example, 
may cause me to become afraid, and this may cause me to run away. It will not do to 
say that it is not actually the shadow itself that causes my fear (but the beams of photons 
which give it its shape, say), for here it is my recognition of this dark patch of ground as 
the shadow of an axe-wielding maniac which causes me to become afraid. If I later find 
out that it was only the shadow of the statue of Charlemagne that stands in the town square 
just up ahead, then my fear dissipates. Salmon's descriptions of the interactions between 
processes do not seem to handle the case of mental states very well. 
It is difficult to say how Salmon would respond to the second objection. Perhaps he 
could say that mental states are always explainable in terms of their corresponding brain 
states. In that case it would be correct to say that it was the photon beams (among other 
things) and not the shadow that caused my 'fear'. But to opt for this strategy is to take a very 
reductionistic view of cognition. I think this is undesirable and unnecessary for a theory 
of causality, let alone for a theory of scientific explanation, but let us leave this issue aside 
for now. I will have a great deal more to say about such matters in the pages that follow. 
With regards to the first (Kitcher's) objection, what I think that Salmon should say is that 
although the shadow does, in a sense, 'transmit' the property of being a dented shadow, this 
is not the same sense of 'transmit' that he is using; for it is obviously not the case that this 
property is being transmitted by the shadow along its world-line. Rather, for the shadow 
to continually display this property, it requires that the car be continuously dented. The 
fact that the shadow exhibits a dent at one moment is not the cause of its exhibiting a dent 
at subsequent moments. It is obviously not the shadow that is transmitting this property. 
However such a response cannot be made by Salmon using the resources of the at-at theory 
alone, for according to the at-at theory, it makes perfect sense to say that the shadow is 
transmitting a mark, for according to all appearances, this is exactly what it is doing, and 
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at-at only gives us a rule that can be applied to appearances. 
But the failings of the mark transmission theory aside, one thing that we can say in 
Salmon's defence is that there obviously are fundamental differences, intuitively at least, 
between causal and pseudo-processes. Salmon's examples clearly demonstrate this (who 
would deny that there is something fundamentally different about a shadow as opposed to 
a car, or about an illuminated spot on a wall as opposed to an actual beam of photons?). 
Perhaps mark transmission is too naive a model, but that does not mean that Salmon's basic 
idea is wrong-headed, for perhaps there is some other criterion that we can identify that can 
distinguish between causal and pseudo-processes. 
One solution (suggested by van Fraassen) is to say that our best scientific theories im-
ply that some processes cannot transmit marks; therefore relative to our theories, some 
processes are causal and some processes are not.29 In fact, in his later writings, Salmon 
abandons the mark transmission criterion altogether and formulates a theory of causal pro-
cesses in just the way suggested. Heavily influenced by Phil Dowe, Salmon eventually 
comes to accept a 'conserved quantity' criterion.30 
Salmon (i.e., his later view) and Dowe actually agree in a great many respects. How-
ever, Dowe, unlike Salmon, foregoes the requirement of transmission. On Dowe's view, 
causal processes and causal interactions are defined as follows: 
CQi. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines which involves exchange 
of a conserved quantity. 
CQ2. A causal process is a world line of an object which possesses a conserved 
quantity.31 
Conserved quantities are simply those quantities that are universally conserved accord-
ing to current scientific theory: mass-energy, linear momentum, and so on. Shadows count 
29van Fraassen 1980, 121. 
30In Salmon, 1994, in response to the criticisms of Dowe and others, he abandoned the mark transmission 
criterion in favour of an 'invariant quantity' criterion, only to later retract that as well and accept Dowe's 
'conserved quantity' criterion, in Salmon, 1997. 
3
'Dowe 1995, 323. 
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as objects, according to Dowe, just as much as cars do; however they are not the right 
kind of object in the sense that they are incapable of possessing the right type of conserved 
quantity (those quantities which are universally conserved according to theory). A shadow 
has shape, position, velocity, and so on; but it cannot possess momentum or energy. 
For Dowe, the main work done by Salmon's transmission criterion is to give causal 
processes a sense of directionality. The conserved quantity, on Salmon's view, must be 
transmitted/row point A to point B (note that this does not, in principle, rule out backwards-
in-time causation). But according to the at-at theory, transmission from A to B amounts 
to the possession of the conserved quantity at every spacetime point along the interval. 
Dowe points out that "the left hand side of this definition has directionality ("from A to B") 
but the right hand side does not ("possession at each spacetime point"). This means that 
transmission, once defined, turns out to lack directionality. Thus the account appears to 
offer an account of causal direction but in fact fails to deliver the goods."32 Given this, the 
requirement of transmission becomes superfluous, for there is nothing involved in it that is 
not already captured by Dowe's notion of the possession of a conserved quantity along the 
world line of an object. 
But defending the transmission requirement, Salmon asks us to consider the example 
of the spotlamp and the spot again. If we consider the world line, not of the spot itself, but 
of the portion of the wall illuminatedby the spot, then it is plain that this object possesses 
a conserved quantity (the energy it receives as a result of its interaction with the photons 
in the beam) all along its world line. Now we would be loath to call this object a causal 
process, of course, and the reason why, according to Salmon, is that this object does not 
transmit any energy; its energy is being received at all times from an exterior source.33 
But for Dowe, Salmon's objection is misguided. He responds that the 'object' that 
Salmon is referring to (the part of the wall illuminated by the spot) is not actually an object 




more than 'spatiotemporal junk'; and whatever is not an object cannot be a causal process 
either. For example. Consider an 'object', x, which we define as: 
for t\ < t < £2 x is the coin in my pocket, 
for ti < t < t3 x is the red pen on my desk. 
for £3 < t < t4 x is my watch.34 
Here, x, occupies a determinate region in spacetime, and for ti,..., £4, x possesses con-
served quantities. Another time-wise gerrymander is "the president of the United States"; 
yet another is "the object nearest to my car", and yet another: "the molecule in this box 
with momentum p". One more is "the part of the wall illuminated by the spot as it moves 
about the stadium". Now do the world-lines of x and of these other time-wise gerrymanders 
qualify as causal processes? 
The answer is no, because x does not qualify as an object. ... I take it that 
an object must be wholly present at a time in order to exist at that time. That 
is, when you have an object at a time, it is not that strictly speaking you just 
have a part of that object - a temporal part. If you have an object then you have 
the whole object at that time. In other words, time-wise gerrymanders are not 
objects.35 
As an alternative to defining an object as something that is 'wholly present at a time', 
Dowe considers the option of taking objects to be four-dimensional; i.e., of considering an 
object as existing in time in the same way that it exists in space, and thus as having both 
temporal and spatial parts. But doing so makes individuation vastly more complicated: 
"Not only do you have to worry about defining the object at a time, but also over time. 




on the space-time diagram are really objects?"36 Dowe also makes the point that this char-
acterization of an object (as something existing in time) is one that is built into our scientific 
theories: 
Scientific quantities are ascribed to objects in a way that is essentially tempo-
rally "localized," ... Scientific quantitative properties are possessed at a time, 
where the instant is thought of as a point. There is no spatial analogy: some-
times planets or particles are in some respects treated as points in space, pos-
sessing, for example, momentum, but this is always recognized as an ideal-
ization. ... But in the case of a putative object consisting of a time-wise ger-
rymander of genuine objects with momentum, there is no sense in which for 
example the sum of the quantities can be ascribed to some object... So, given 
that we are trying to distinguish genuine from pseudo objects via possession of 
scientific quantities, it makes sense to adopt the concept of an object as wholly 
present at a time.37 
But with respect to Dowe's example of the 'object' consisting of the coin, the red pen, 
and the watch, Salmon objects that this is just a red herring: on Salmon's view, causal 
processes are spatiotemporally continuous (i.e., they have a continuous world line), and 
unlike the part of the wall illuminated by the spot, x does not count as an object on his view 
either (although each piece of it does). With respect to the illuminated portion of the wall, 
Salmon makes the point that the concept of genidentity (identity over time), which Dowe 
uses but does not analyze, is just as difficult a concept whether we take objects to be three-
dimensional or four-dimensional. We are probably all aware of the famous philosophical 
problem of the ship of Theseus;38 or consider the following more abstract example: suppose 
that a completed jigsaw puzzle comes into existence at time t0. If at time ti we take the 
puzzle apart, then it goes out of existence. But if at time t2 we put the pieces back together 
again, is the completed puzzle at time t0 the same or different from the completed puzzle at 
time t-p. Things are particularly difficult in the quantum domain, where in some cases it is 
impossible in principle to determine genidentity, for example when two identical particles 
36Dowe 1995, 330. 
"Dowe 1995. 330-331. 
38The ship on display in ancient Athens that over time, had all of its original parts replaced. 
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collide.39 
But in light of certain aspects of Salmon's own theory, Salmon's criticisms of Dowe 
strike me as strange. Salmon's view, if we take it literally, seems to entail that a baseball 
or a bullet flying through the air cannot actually count as a single causal process. After 
explaining his invariant quantity theory (the second incarnation of his transmission view), 
he writes: 
Speaking literally, the foregoing definitions imply that a causal process does 
not enter into any causal interactions. For example, a gas molecule constitutes 
a causal process between its collisions with other molecules or the walls of the 
container. When it collides with another molecule, it becomes another causal 
process which endures until the next collision. ... When we understand this 
technical detail, there is no harm in referring to the history of a molecule over 
a considerable period of time as a single (composite) causal process that enters 
into many interactions.40 
With regard to bullets or baseballs flying through the air (and interacting with atmo-
spheric molecules), he writes: 
In this, and many similar sorts of situations, we would simply ignore such 
interactions because the energy-momentum exchanges are too small to mat-
ter. Pragmatic considerations determine whether a given "process" is to be 
regarded as a single process or a complex network of processes and interac-
tions.41 
Salmon cannot have it both ways. He cannot say that for pragmatic reasons we should 
forget about the interactions between the baseball and the air molecules - that we can ideal-
ize this process for the purposes of explaining the baseball's flight - while at the same time 
deny to Dowe that he can treat Theseus' ship, as it was in the beginning, and Theseus' ship 
as it was after all of its original parts had been replaced, as the same object - in other words 
that he can idealize the ship for pragmatic reasons. Just as we can decide, for pragmatic 
39Cf. Feynman 1965 §§3-4. 
40Salmon 1994,308-309. 
41
 Salmon 1994,309. 
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reasons, what we will count as a process, we can decide, again for pragmatic reasons, what 
we will count as an object existing wholly in time from one moment to the next. 
Further, Dowe's second point has not been addressed. It is still the case that scientific 
quantities are ascribed, in our theories, to objects situated in time. While there is nothing 
barring us from characterizing objects in four dimensions, it is more convenient, and it 
simply makes more sense, to be consistent with the language of our scientific theories in 
our description of causal processes. Perhaps it is even necessary. This last point is one that 
I will return to in my final chapter. 
But whatever the merits of the accounts of causality that we have considered here are, 
as accounts of explanation in general they are, if not deficient then at least incomplete; for 
they say nothing about explanations which do not involve causes at all; and these certainly 
do exist. There are explanations in terms of structural laws, such as the Pauli exclusion 
principle42 and Boyle's law for gases.43 Kitcher points to the cases of formal linguistics 
and mathematics: 
Two obvious examples are formal syntax and pure mathematics. Explanations 
of the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of particular strings in particular 
natural languages are given by identifying the constraints set by the underlying 
rules of syntax. Note that it will not do to suggest that the formal explanation 
is a placeholder for a description of causal processes that occur in the brains 
of speakers - for part of the point of the enterprise is to distinguish between 
explanations of competence and explanations of performance.44 
Later, I will examine one decidedly non-causal class of explanations: those given ac-
cording to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. However with respect to 
the examples above, it is, I think, possible to contest them (although I do not). It might, 
42The Pauli exclusion principle is a purely formal law to the effect that no two identical fermions (particles 
with a half-integer spin, e.g., protons, electrons, etc.) can simultaneously occupy the same quantum state. 
This explains why, in an atom, only two electrons are allowed per orbit. Since with respect to a particular 
orbit there are only two possible spin values for the electron, only two electrons (with opposite spin values) 
are permitted to occupy the same orbit at any one time. 
43




for example, seem odd, for some, to call a mathematical derivation an explanation. As for 
the structural laws, perhaps they can in principle be further explicated in terms of causal 
mechanisms? But whatever the case may be, an account of explanation should not force us 
to commit ourselves in either direction. An ideal account of explanation should, if possible, 
be capable of handling both causal and non-causal cases. 
1.3 Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation 
A second aspect of explanation that is neglected by Hempel's D-N model is the so-
called pragmatic aspect. If we consider an explanation to be an answer to a 'why-question' 
('why is the sky blue?', 'why is my brother so mean?', etc.), then the answer to a why-
question will depend on the context in which it is asked, and what in certain contexts may 
seem like an inappropriate explanation will in other contexts constitute a perfectly good 
one. Consider the following variation on the 'flagpole' example, in which the length of a 
tower's shadow explains its height: 
That tower marks the spot where he killed the maid with whom he had been 
in love to the point of madness. And the height of the tower? He vowed that 
shadow would cover the terrace where he first proclaimed his love, with every 
setting sun - that is why the tower had to be so high.45 
For van Fraassen, all explanations are answers to why-questions; questions of the form 
"Why (is it the case that) P in contrast to (other members of) X?", where the second half 
of the question is taken as implicit in context and typically left unstated. X is called the 
contrast class, and is a set of alternatives to P. For example, the question: "Why did you 
dye your hair black?" could be interpreted as either "Why did you dye your hair black, as 
opposed to blond or blue or orange?", or alternatively, "Why did you dye your hair black, 
as opposed to not dying it at all?". An answer to a why-question will be one that favours P 
over any of its alternatives in the given contrast class. 
45van Fraassen, 1980, 133-134. 
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Now imagine I ask you the question, "Can you get to Victoria both by ferry and by 
plane?" And consider the following alternative answers:46 
(a) Yes. 
(b) You can get to Victoria both by ferry and by plane. 
(c) You can get to Victoria by ferry 
(d) You can get to Victoria both by ferry and by plane, but the ferry ride is not to be 
missed. 
(e) You can certainly get to Victoria by ferry, and that is something not to be missed. 
(b), here, is called a direct answer. It provides just enough information to answer the 
question, (a) is shorthand for (b). (c) and (e) are partial answers, for they are implied by 
the direct answer, (d), finally, is called a complete answer, for though it supplies additional 
information, it implies the direct answer. We next define the following concepts: 
a presupposition of question Q is any proposition which is implied by all direct an-
swers to Q. 
a correction (or corrective answer) to Q is any denial of any presupposition of Q. 
the (basic) presupposition of Q is the proposition which is true if and only if some 
direct answer to Q is true.47 
A question, Q, arises in a given context, when given that context, a certain body of 
background information, K, implies the central presupposition of Q. If the central presup-
position of Q is not implied by K, our answer is simply that the questioner is mistaken. 
For example, suppose I ask you the question, "Why does Santa Claus live at the north 
pole?" In this case, the background knowledge, K, which is accessible to both of us, im-
plies that there is no Santa Claus. Therefore I retort with the corrective answer: "But you 
are mistaken. Santa Claus does not exist." 
46Cf. vanFraassen 1980, 138. 
47vanFraassenl980, 140. 
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Now consider the following question, "Why is this engineer insane?". We can interpret 
this more formally as Q = "Why is it the case that this engineer is insane in contrast to 
those other engineers?". Now P is the proposition that this engineer is insane. We call it the 
topic of concern. It is also the basic presupposition of Q. The contrast class, X, is "those 
other engineers". Finally, there is what van Fraassen calls the 'respect-in-which a reason is 
requested': the relevance relation, R. An answer, A, counts as being explanatorily relevant 
to a question if R holds between A and < Pk, X >. Relevant answers might consist, for 
example, of certain events in this engineer's childhood, a strained relationship with her co-
workers, etc. It is important to note that we cannot judge the relevance relation in isolation; 
"... we must say of a given proposition that it is or is not relevant (in this context) to the 
topic with respect to that contrast class."48 
Thus we can define a why-question, Q, according to the following schema: 
Q=<Pk,X,R> 
Where Pk is the topic, X is the contrast class, and R is the relevance relation. And an 
answer to Q will be expressed as follows: Pk in contrast to (the rest of) X because A. We 
can now define a direct answer in the following way: 
B is a direct answer to question Q = < Pk,X,R > exactly if there is some 
proposition A such that A bears relation R to < Pk, X > and B is the propo-
sition which is true exactly if (Pk; and for all i ^ k, not Pi, and 4^) is true.49 
Van Fraassen's theory of the pragmatics of explanation is actually put forward by him 
as an overall theory of explanation; however taken in the latter sense it runs into problems 
on account of the fact that he imposes absolutely no restrictions on the relevance relation. 
As Salmon writes: 
van Fraassen 1980, 142. 
'van Fraassen 1980, 144. 
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Suppose that someone asks why John F. Kennedy died on 22 November 1963; 
this is the question Q =< Pk,X,R>, where 
Pfc = JFK died 11/22/63 
X = {JFK died 1/1/63, JFK died 1/2/63,... JFK survived 1963} 
R - astral influence 
Suppose that the direct answer is Pk in contrast to the rest of X because A, 
where A ... consists of a true description of the configuration of the planets, 
sun, moon, and stars at the time of Kennedy's birth. Suppose further that 
the person who supplies the answer has an astrological theory from which it 
follows that, given A, it was certain, or highly probable, that Kennedy would 
die on that day. We now have a why-question and an answer; the answer is an 
explanation. We must ask how good it is.50 
Second, as impressive as van Fraassen's theory of'why-questions' is, it ignores other 
types of questions, so-called 'how-possibly' questions. For example, 'How can Santa Claus 
possibly manage to deliver all those toys in just one evening?'. This question does not ask 
for the reason why Santa Claus does this, but for a description of how he does it. It implies 
that the answer should consist of an account of the special characteristics of the sled and of 
the reindeer, the circumference of the earth, how many deliveries need to be made, and so 
on. Of course, this how-possibly question could be translated into something like: 'Why 
is it that Santa Claus is able to deliver all those toys in just one evening?'. But I do not 
think this will do. I can always answer that why-question with something like: 'because 
he can afford to buy the proper equipment'. The how-possibly question, in contrast, seems 
to demand that we explain exactly how it is that his equipment is 'proper'. Now I do not 
want to venture further into this debate, for I think that the theory of explanation which I 
am about to introduce can be seen as an 'umbrella' theory under which both the causal and 
pragmatic aspects of explanation can fit, minus these objectionable consequences. This is 
Peter Railton's theory, and it is the subject of the next section. 
50Salmon 1989, 142. See also: Kitcher & Salmon, 1987. 
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1.4 The Deductive-Nomological-Probabilistic Model 
The view that, to my mind, best deals with both pragmatic and causal concerns is that of 
Peter Railton. Railton accepts the D-N model as a starting point. However, unlike Hempel, 
whose conception of explanation is epistemic, Railton's conception (like Salmon's) is on-
tic. For Railton, the goal of explanation is not to give reasons to expect the occurrence 
of a phenomenon, but to give an account of the actual mechanisms that underlie the phe-
nomenon: 
While prediction and control may exhaust our practical problems in the nat-
ural world ... explanation is an activity not wholly practical in purpose. The 
goal of understanding the world is a theoretical goal, and if the world is a ma-
chine - a vast arrangement of nomic connections - then our theory ought to 
give us some insight into the structure and workings of the mechanism, above 
and beyond the capability of predicting and controlling its outcomes ... Is the 
deductive-nomological model of explanation therefore unacceptable? - No, 
just incomplete. Calling for an account of the mechanism leaves open the na-
ture of that account, and as far as I can see, the model explanations offered in 
scientific texts are D-N when complete, D-N sketches when not.51 
Railton purposely leaves the definition of mechanism vague; but this is a virtue of his 
model, for we can leave it open whether, for example, Salmon's or Dowe's characterization 
of causal processes is the correct one. Further, his 'account of the mechanism' need not 
appeal to causes at all where these are inapplicable (e.g., in the case of the Pauli exclusion 
principle that I mentioned above, and in general for what he calls 'structural laws'52). The 
requirement to give an account of the mechanism can thus be read as a requirement to 
have our explanations be as deep and as detailed (and as true) as science allows. On this 
view, the D-N explanation of the flagpole's height in terms of its shadow (but not van 
Fraassen's version of it) is clearly unsatisfactory: it tells us nothing about the (in this case, 
causal) processes from which the flagpole resulted. A good explanation would have to 
5lRailton 1978,208. 
52These include, e.g., the second law of thermodynamics, the principle that the speed of light is constant 
in all inertial frames, and so on. 
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involve an appeal to the materials from which the flagpole was constructed, the method of 
its construction, perhaps a description of its intended use, and so on. 
The requirement to give an account of the mechanism also allows us to satisfactorily 
answer a particularly difficult counter-example to HempePs version of the D-N model.53 
This is Peter Achinstein's 'intervening-cause' counter-example, where what in normal cir-
cumstances constitutes a perfectly good explanation for an occurrence is made irrelevant by 
some intervening event. For example, suppose someone, call him John Jones, eats a pound 
of arsenic at time t. Call this circumstance C\, and let L\ be the law such that anyone who 
eats a pound of arsenic at time t will be dead within 24 hours oft. Now if Jones is dead 
after only 3 hours (the explanandum event, E), then in that case, C\, L\, and E make up 
a perfectly good D-N argument for Jones' death (this argument satisfies all of Hempel's 
criteria and we can infer E from C\ and L{). But suppose that Jones is actually hit by a 
bus at time t + 3h. That Jones ate a pound of arsenic is irrelevant to his actual death - for 
the bus caused his death. But our D-N argument fails to capture this. On Railton's account, 
however, any explanation that does not completely trace the (in this case, causal) history of 
the events leading up to his death would be insufficient - we would be required to mention 
the bus (as well as the fact that Jones was found bruised and bleeding underneath it). 
For Railton, D-N explanations are actually a special case of what he calls the Deductive-
Nomological-Probabilistic (D-N-P) model. In its complete form, the D-N-P is a schema 
through which we can explain the occurrence of any phenomena, whether that occurrence is 
deterministic or indeterministic, probable or improbable. It is represented (my paraphrase) 
as follows: 
(1) A complete theoretical account of the mechanism involved in the production of the 
phenomenon described by the explanandum statement, and a derivation, from our 
theory, of the laws required to infer the probability of occurrence of the explanandum 
phenomenon, E. 
(2) A D-N argument from the laws derived in (1) to the probability of occurrence of E. 
53Cf. Achinstein, 168. 
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(3) A statement to the effect that E actually did occur.54 
The D-N argument, while still a necessary condition for explanation, is assigned a rel-
atively small role. Most of the work is actually done in step (1). Note, also, that what we 
infer from the D-N argument is not the occurrence of the explanandum event, but merely 
the probability of its occurrence. The last step, what Railton calls the 'parenthetic adden-
dum', is used to chain one or more explanations together. It is actually required only for 
probabilistic explanations (which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter). In the 
case of deterministic phenomena, the parenthetic addendum is redundant and can be left 
out (since the probability of its occurrence is 1). 
Step (1), as we saw, requires us to give a complete theoretical account of the laws and 
conditions invoked in step (2). But one might object that Railton's requirement places an 
extremely heavy burden on the explainer (and on the person being explained to). Indeed, it 
seems likely that an exhaustive search through the entire class of introductory level (likely 
even advanced) science textbooks would fail to turn up even one explanation that comes 
close to meeting Railton's requirement. Moreover, the laws that we give an account of, 
for Railton, must be true laws, in a very strict sense. Strictly speaking, we cannot appeal 
to statistical laws in our explanans where these serve merely as approximations of the 
behaviour of deterministic phenomena. Thus, statistical laws that explain weather patterns, 
or roulette wheels - indeed most of the statistical laws that are actually used in every day 
scientific practice - cannot figure in an ideal explanation. Railton does not see this as 
problematic: 
The use of epistemic or statistical probabilities in connection with such phe-
nomena unquestionably has instrumental value, and should not be given up. 
What must be given up is the idea that explanations can be based on probabil-
ities that have no role in bringing the world's explananda about, but serve only 
to describe deterministic phenomena.55 
54Cf. Railton 1978,214,218. 
55Ibid., 223. 
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Railton's exhortations aside, one might still feel a little uneasy about 'giving up' as 
'not an explanation' so much of the explaining that scientists actually do. A related con-
cern is what to say about explanations involving the laws, e.g., of Newtonian physics. On 
HempePs view, recall, the use of these derivative laws is unproblematic. But it is not 
clear whether something similar can be done - in practice - on Railton's account, for if the 
requirement is to give as deep and as detailed an explanation as possible, then even if, tech-
nically, we do not rule out derivative laws, it does not appear that we are ever in a position 
to use them; for it is hard to see how any explanation of, e.g., the motion of the planets, can 
be given without appealing to the laws and principles of general relativity. 
Railton's answer to these concerns is his notion of'explanatory information'. He writes: 
Whatever the reason, does the D-N-P account force us to say that these 
less-than-full-fledged specimens are not explanations? 
In many cases, that would be an intolerably strict position to take. But 
where should one draw the line between explanation and non-explanation? 
The answer lies in not drawing lines, at least at this point, and in recogniz-
ing a continuum of explanatoriness. ... At one end we find what I will call an 
ideal D-N-P text... At the other end we find statements completely devoid of 
what I will call 'explanatory information'. What is explanatory information? 
Consider an ideal D-N-P text for the explanation of a fact p. Now consider 
any statement S that, were we ignorant of this text but conversant with the 
language and concepts employed in it and in S, would enable us to answer 
questions about this text in such a way as to eliminate some degree of uncer-
tainty about what is contained in it. To the extent that S enables us to give 
accurate answers to such questions, i.e., to the extent that it enables us to re-
construct this text or otherwise illuminates the features of this text, we may say 
that S provides explanatory information concerning why p.56 
Thus we do not need to rewrite all of our science textbooks; they succeed in conveying 
explanatory information. The case is similar for Newtonian physics. As for the (not irre-
ducibly) statistical laws: "... it should be no mystery that statistical generalizations believed 
not to reflect underlying probabilistic laws may still be explanatory, once we recognize that 
56Railton 1981,240. 
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they function in explanation not as ersat2 laws but as summaries of information about initial 
conditions and boundary conditions"57 
A further advantage of the notion of explanatory information is that it brings pragmatic 
considerations into the picture. If I am confronted with a a why-question, I can convey 
whatever part of the explanatory text I consider to be salient to the questioner (this will 
depend on the knowledge situation, K that both I and the questioner share, and also on 
the exact why-question, Q —< Pk,X,R > that I am asked). And since the relevance 
relation is constrained by the explanatory text, whatever answer is given must correspond 
to something in that text. There is no possibility of giving a proper explanation of JFK's 
death in terms of the configuration of the planets at the time of his birth. Thus while salience 
is a subjective matter, relevance is an objective one.58 
But now even with the notion of explanatory information, Railton's account of expla-
nation may still make us feel uneasy, for consider his comments on the ideal explanatory 
text: 
... an ideal text for the explanation of the outcome of a causal process would 
look something like this: an inter-connected series of law-based accounts of 
all the nodes and links in the causal network culminating in the explanandum, 
complete with a fully detailed description of the causal mechanisms involved 
and theoretical derivations of all the covering laws involved. This full-blown 
causal account would extend, via various relations of reduction and superve-
nience, to all levels of analysis, i.e., the ideal text would be closed under re-
lations of causal dependence, reduction, and supervenience. It would be the 
whole story concerning why the explanandum occurred, relative to a correct 
theory of the lawful dependencies of the world. Such an ideal causal D-N text 
would be infinite if time were without beginning or infinitely divisible, and 
plainly there is no question of ever setting such an ideal text down on paper.59 
Thus it appears that an (ideal) explanation of any phenomenon must go all the way 
down to the level of quantum physics if it is to be complete. Now we are not required to do 
so in order to convey explanatory information: 
S1
 Ibid., 251. 
58Salmon also makes this point, in: Salmon 1989, 162. 
59Railton 1981,247. 
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... within the division of labour among scientists it is possible to find [some 
group] interested in developing the ability to fill in virtually any particular as-
pect of ideal texts ... A chemist may be uninterested in how the reagents he 
handles came into being; a cosmologist may be interested in just that; a ge-
ologist may be interested in how those substances came to be distributed over 
the surface of the earth; an evolutionary biologist may be interested in how 
chemists (and the rest of us) came into being ... 60 
Still, I am not sure that, e.g., conveying explanatory information about the radioactive 
properties of the atoms in Jones' brain tells us anything about, say, Jones' barophobia.61 
I, for one, do not believe that (hard) reductionism is true. This is, of course, arguable. 
But whether or not hard reductionism is true, I do not believe that an account of scientific 
explanation should force us to commit to it. Thus while it may seem like nit-picking on my 
part, I suggest that we weaken Railton's account. Instead of maintaining that there be one 
ideal explanatory text for a given fact, why not say instead that there can be many (e.g., one 
per special science)? Whether or not any one of these texts is reducible to any other then 
becomes a separate question. Let the debate rage on. As long as our account of explanation 
keeps these texts separate, the outcome of that debate cannot impact us. 
Now one might object along the following lines: "even if I give you that you may have 
more than one ideal text for a fact, are they not still ideal texts for one and the same phe-
nomenon! How is your position any different from saying, as Railton does, that all of these 
represent different aspects of the same phenomenon, and that therefore they represent dif-
ferent aspects of one and the same ideal explanatory text for that phenomenon?" My point, 
however, is that they are not the same phenomenon; "barophobia" is not a phenomenon 
that one encounters in quantum physics. "Alpha-decay" is not a phenomenon that one en-
counters in psychology; for the concepts that we use to describe phenomena in these two 
sciences are not, to my mind, translatable. The fact that these phenomena happen to be 
associated with the same spacetime point (which is yet another conceptualization) does not 
entail that they are identical phenomena. Again, this is debatable. I will come back to this 
60lbid. 
61
 The fear of gravity. 
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issue in chapter 3, but for now, let me just say that it would prima facie be useful, from the 
standpoint of an account of explanation, to at least allow that it is possible that the special 
sciences are not all reducible to physics. If our account of explanation stands or falls on 
this issue, so much the worse for us. 
We have come to the end of this chapter. Before we conclude, let us take the oppor-
tunity to look back at the ground we have covered so far. We discussed four models of 
explanation: Hempel and Oppenheim's D-N model, according to which explanations are 
arguments that proceed deductively from a set of statements describing laws and initial 
conditions, to a statement describing the fact to be explained; Salmon's C-M model, ac-
cording to which an explanation is a detailed tracing out of the causal history of an event; 
van Fraassen's theory of why-questions; and finally, Railton's D-N-P model which attempts 
to retain the best aspects of all three of these. 
With respect to Hempel's D-N model, one of its virtues is that it is metaphysically 
neutral. It takes no stance on whether the laws appealed to in explanations are literally 
true, and it takes no stance on the issue of whether some, or all, or none of the explanations 
given in scientific contexts are causal explanations. On the other hand, I argued that the 
D-N model fails to account for the asymmetrical character of causal explanations, and that 
it fails to account for the role that pragmatic considerations often play - for the fact that 
the worth of an explanation is usually judged with respect to the context in which it is 
given. With respect to the causal models of explanation, we saw two accounts of causality 
in terms of causal processes: Salmon's, for which the emphasis is on transmission (either 
of a mark or of a conserved quantity), and Dowe's, for which the emphasis is on the idea of 
an object, existing in time, endowed with causal powers (i.e. with conserved quantities).62 I 
argued that purely causal models, though promising as accounts of causation, are deficient 
as accounts of explanation in general because they fail to account for the many non-causal 
explanations that actually occur in scientific contexts. Van Fraassen's pragmatic model 
62This notion of an object as something existing wholly at a time is actually quite important and it is 
something that I will return to in my third chapter. 
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(his theory of why-questions and their answers) likewise is promising as an account of the 
pragmatics of explanation, however as an account of explanation it is deficient due to the 
fact that it does not place any restrictions on the relevance relation between an answer and 
the question asked. In sum: the pragmatic theory does not restrict permissible explanations 
enough, while the causal theory restricts them too much. 
Railton's account is in a certain sense a compromise position. Railton's D-N-P model 
keeps the D-N model as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for explanation; the D-
N-P's requirement to give a thorough account of the mechanism (while leaving the actual 
nature of the mechanism open) is sufficient to satisfy the causal theorists; Railton's notion 
of explanatory information is sufficient to satisfy those, such as van Fraassen, who place 
more emphasis on the pragmatic aspects of explanation; and by combining these it seems 
as though he has eliminated the main problems with all of them. But I argued that Rail-
ton has not gone far enough. For his ontic account of explanation still makes too many 
metaphysical assumptions. We have yet to see all of these, but what we have seen so far 
is that Railton's view entails that there can be only one true ideal explanation for any phe-
nomenon. I argued, however, that we should reject this requirement and that we should not 
commit ourselves to such an extreme reductionistic picture of science. 
It might seem, however, as though I have robbed the D-N-P of its heart and soul. It is the 
principal requirement of Railton's view, recall, to go as deep as possible in our explanations 
in order to get at the truth. But if we eliminate this requirement, then what is left? It looks, 
now, as though the D-N-P is no better at handling the problem of the relevance relation 
than van Fraassen's theory, and is not the door wide open to just any old explanation, 
astrological or otherwise? No. For I have not argued that we should forego the goal of 
explaining phenomena as deeply and as truly as possible. And I have not denied that an 
ideal explanation is the one that is maximally deep and maximally true. I have simply made 
the point that in giving an account of explanation we should allow that sometimes it may 
(perhaps) be impossible in principle to reduce one level of description to another. Now this 
31 
may be at odds with Railton's own views on the subject. But I am not defending Railton 
here, only his model. 
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Chapter 2 
Explanations of Indeterministic 
Phenomena 
We now leave deterministic phenomena and begin our discussion of explanations of in-
deterministic phenomena. The two views that I will focus on here are Hempel's Inductive-
Statistical (I-S) account of explanation and Railton's D-N-P account of probabilistic ex-
planation (which I introduced in the last chapter). But before we begin our discussion of 
probabilistic explanation, we must first discuss the concept of probability itself and of its 
various interpretations. I will focus, here on the interpretations that are most relevant to 
our purposes: the classical, frequentist, logical, and propensity interpretations, as well as 
Carnap's hybrid view. 
2.1 Probability and its Interpretations 
When the outcome of a physical process is uncertain, we say that that outcome has a 
particular probability to occur. For example, on any given spin of a roulette wheel, it is 
practically impossible (though perhaps possible in principle) to describe the initial condi-
tions of the spin precisely enough to determine exactly which square the ball will land on. 
To make such a determination, we would need, for instance, to take account of the velocity 
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of the wheel, the motion of the croupier's hand, the temperature and humidity of the air 
in the room, the material out of which the wheel and ball are made, and a host of other 
conditions. Instead, we say that for any given spin, the probability of, say, landing on a red 
space is .4737 (i.e., 47.37%).' But what is the meaning of a probability statement? Does 
it assert an objective characteristic about the physical process we are describing, or is it 
a measure of our knowledge of the situation under consideration? This is the question to 
which I now turn. 
The Probability Calculus 
Before we begin, however, it will be useful to briefly describe the basic mathemat-
ical properties of probability statements, defined by the so-called 'probability calculus'. 
The probability calculus, as defined by Kolmogorov, rests on three basic axioms (the Kol-
mogorov axioms), which we can illustrate informally as follows. Consider the set of possi-
ble results for the roll of an ordinary die: {1,2,3,4,5,6}. Call this set Jl. Let F be the set of 
all non-empty subsets of ft, i.e. {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, {1,2}, {1,3},... {1,2,3}, 
{1,2,4}, ... {1,2,3,4,5,6}}. Now let A be some arbitrary element of F. We then call 
P(A) the 'probability of A\ For example, if A = {2,4,5}, then P(A) is the probability 
that a die lands on either 2 or 4 or 5. According to the first axiom of the calculus, P(A) is 
always a non-negative real number, i.e.: 
(1) P(A) > 0, V i e F 
Now recall that Q represents all possible results. Thus P(fl), in this case, will be 
the probability of landing on either 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6. Since these exhaust all 
possibilities, we can say that it is certain that one of the outcomes belonging to tt will 
1
 In American roulette. 
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obtain. According to the second axiom, we represent certainty by the value 1. Thus, 
(2) P(fi) = l 
Finally, the probability that either A or B occurs (where A and B are subsets of F and 
have no elements in common) is given by the addition rule, which is the third axiom: 
(3) P(AUB) = P{A) + P(B), VA, B e F, where A n B = 0 
For example, P({1} U {2}) = P{1} + P{2} = 1/6 +1/6 = 2/6. We can derive all the 
other theorems of the calculus from these three axioms. For example, the multiplication 
rule, for the probability that both A and B occur (where A and B are independent events2) 
is given by: 
P(A • B) = P(A) x P(B) 
One important concept is that of conditional probability, the probability of A given B. 
For example, in scientific contexts we often speak of the probability of an hypothesis given 
the evidence. We can define this in terms of the multiplication rule as follows:3 
P(A\B) = P(A • B)/P(B) 
While the probability calculus gives us rules for computing complex probabilities from 
prior probabilities, it says nothing about how the prior probabilities themselves (e.g., P(A)) 
should be determined. In other words, the question of the meaning of primitive probability 
statements is left open. But while the probability calculus does not define the meaning, it 
does place constraints on it; for any interpretation of probability must satisfy the rules of 
the calculus. 
2Imagine a roll of two dice, where A refers to the outcome of the first and B to the outcome of the second. 
3In some books, the symbols are reversed; i.e., 'the probability of A given B' is written as P(B\A) 
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The Classical Interpretation 
What we now call the classical interpretation of probability was formulated by Pierre 
Simon Laplace in the early part of the 19th century. On Laplace's view, the world is a vast 
causal network, thoroughly deterministic in every respect. If it were possible for us to have 
the eye of a deity; i.e., a comprehensive knowledge of the universe, of its every system 
and of its every state, we would have no need for statements of probability; for everything 
would be provable through the application of deterministic laws. As we are equipped with 
finite minds, however, all that we can hope for is an approximation of this ideal, which we 
approach by means of probability statements. 
The basic principle behind Laplace's theory is the 'Principle of Insufficient Reason'.4 
According to this principle, if I have no reason to prefer one outcome to any other, I must 
consider all of them as equally possible. 
La probability est relative en partie a cette ignorance, en partie a nos connais-
sances. Nous savons que sur trois ou un plus grand nombre d'evenemens, un 
seul doit arriver; mais rien ne porte a croire que l'un d'eux arrivera plutot que 
les autres. Dans cet etat d'indecision, il nous est impossible de prononcer avec 
certitude sur leur arrivee. II est cependant probable qu'un de ces evenemens 
pris a volonte, n'arrivera pas; parce que nous voyons plusiers cas egalement 
possibles qui excluent son existence, tandis qu'un seul la favorise.5 
For example, consider a six-sided die. Assuming the die is not biased, I cannot say that 
rolling a 3 is any more likely than rolling another number, for as far as I can tell, all of 
these outcomes are equally possible. But now once we have divided the possible outcomes 
of an event into a number of equally possible cases, the probability of a particular outcome 
becomes a simple ratio: of the cases that are 'favourable' to an outcome, to the total possible 
cases: 
4This is sometimes called the 'Principle of Indifference'. 
5Laplacel825,7. 
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La theorie des hasards consiste a reduire tous les evenemens du meme genre, 
a un certain nombre de cas egalement possibles, c'est-a dire, tels que nous 
soyons egalement indecis sur leur existence; et a determiner le nombre de cas 
favorables a levenement dont on cherche la probabilite. Le rapport de ce nom-
bre a celui de tous les cas possibles, est la mesure de cette probabilite qui n'est 
ainsi qu'une fraction dont le numerateur est le nombre des cas favorables, et 
dont le denominateur est le nombre de tous les cas possibles.6 
For example, if I want to calculate the probability of rolling a 2, the number of cases 
favourable to this outcome is one. If, on the other hand, I would like to calculate the 
probability of rolling an even number, the number of cases favourable to this outcome is 
three (i.e., 2, 4, and 6). To get the probability, I divide the cases favourable to the outcome 
by the total number of possible cases. The probability of rolling a 2, therefore, is 1/6, and 
the probability of rolling an even number is 3/6 = 1/2. 
The Frequency Interpretations of von Mises and Reichenbach 
The classical interpretation was the dominant interpretation of probability for many 
decades, and it accords very well with our intuitions concerning games of chance (e.g., 
craps, roulette wheels, lotteries, etc.). However applying it more generally, as we will see 
shortly, proves to be problematic. Thus by the mid-19tft century, an alternative interpreta-
tion began to emerge largely through the work of Leslie Ellis and John Venn. This came 
to be called the frequency interpretation, and its first rigorous formulation was given by 
Richard von Mises early in the 20tft century. 
To help to understand the motivation behind the frequency interpretation, consider the 
case of a biased die. For Laplace, statements of probability must be defined with respect 
to equally probable cases. But suppose I shift the centre of gravity of this die, or file 
away one of its corners. If I do this, then it will no longer be the case that each outcome 
is equally possible. But regardless, we would still like to say that there is some specific 
probability of throwing an even number with this die. On the classical conception, however, 
6lbid 
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this probability appears to be impossible to calculate. 
A more telling example has to do with the probability of death (e.g., as used by insur-
ance companies). Suppose we say that the probability of death for a forty year-old non-
smoking male is 0.011. It is not clear at all how the classical interpretation can conceive of 
a case like this one. Von Mises asks: 
Are there 1000 different probabilities, eleven of which are 'favourable' to the 
occurrence of death, or are there 3000 possibilities and thirty-three 'favourable' 
ones? It would be useless to search the textbooks for an answer, for no discus-
sion on how to define equally likely cases in questions of this kind are given.7 
Probability gets defined, for von Mises, as the relative frequency of an outcome with 
respect to a sequence of repeatable events. For example, given a sequence of 1000 rolls 
of a single die, we might observe that 6 turns up 300 times. We can then say that the 
relative frequency of 6 in this sequence is 300/1000 = 0.3. The longer the sequence, the 
more closely the observed relative frequency approaches the true probability of rolling a 6 
(which is considered to be a 'physical' attribute of the sequence). The probability, then, of 
getting a 6 with this die, is a kind of idealization: it is defined as the limiting value of the 
relative frequency of 6 with respect to an infinite sequence of rolls. 
To illustrate how this works: suppose that after each roll of the die I calculate the 
relative frequency of 6, rounding off to the first decimal place. I eventually find, after n 
rolls, that the relative frequency ceases to change; it remains constant at, say, 0.3. At this 
point, I increase the number of decimal places to two. The value begins to fluctuate again, 
but after m more rolls, it again ceases to change; it stays constant at, say .32. I then increase 
the precision to three places. Again, the relative frequency eventually stabilizes; this time 
at .324. If I continue the process infinitely, the relative frequency will be accurate to an 
infinite number of decimal points.8 
7von Mises 1957,69-70. 
8Cf. von Mises 1957,14-15. 
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Now on von Mises' view, probability statements must always refer to a 'collective', or 
what we now normally call a reference class: "a sequence of uniform events or processes 
which differ by certain observable attributes."9 One such collective is the sequence of rolls 
with a biased die, where each member of the sequence potentially differs with respect to 
the actual number showing on its topmost face at the end of each roll. Another collective 
is the class consisting of all non-smoking males in their fortieth year of life, where each 
member of the sequence potentially differs with respect to whether or not they are dead 
by the end of that year. Specifying an appropriate reference class is of crucial importance 
in determining relative frequencies. To see why, consider the collective consisting of men 
over 40, for which we wish to determine the probability of going senile. Relative to this 
reference class, the probability of senility is likely very low. But if we narrow the reference 
class so that it consists of men over 90, the probability of senility is much higher. Now for 
von Mises, probability statements do not have any meaning whatsoever unless they refer 
to a collective; i.e., on his view there is no such thing as the absolute probability of the 
event A. All probabilities are conditional probabilities of the form P(A\R), where R is 
the reference class. So-called 'single-case' probability statements are meaningless, for von 
Mises. 
It is utter nonsense to say, for instance, that Mr. X, now aged forty, has the 
probability 0.011 of dying in the course of the next year. ... One might suggest 
that a correct value of the probability of death for Mr. X may be obtained by 
restricting the collective to which he belongs as far as possible ... There is, 
however, no end to this process, and if we go further and further into the selec-
tion of members of the collective, we shall be left finally with this individual 
alone.10 
A true single case probability, for von Mises, would have to take this actual individual 
as the reference class. And to specify this individual we must specify all the ways in which 
it differs from every other individual. But in that case, there is no sense in speaking of 
9von Mises 1957, 12. 
!0von Mises 1957, 17-18. 
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the probability of an event with respect to this individual, for we have now defined this 
reference class so precisely that we can determine the outcome of any future event with 
certainty. Thus von Mises' frequency interpretation is similar to the classical interpretation 
at least in this respect: the probability of an event is defined with respect to which properties 
we choose to include, which properties we choose to ignore, and which properties we have 
no knowledge of when we define the reference class. 
One problem with von Mises' version of frequentism is that it involves an inference 
from actually observed sequences of events, which are finite, to infinite sequences of those 
same events. But in fact, as Wittgenstein points out, it is possible to infer infinitely many 
infinite sequences from a finite sequence (which we take as the infinite sequence's initial 
segment). 
If we infer from the relative frequency of an event its relative frequency in the 
future, we can of course only do that from the frequency which has in fact been 
so far observed. And not from one we have derived from observation by some 
process or other for calculating probabilities. For the probability we calculate 
is compatible with any frequency whatever that we actually observe, since it 
leaves the time open.11 
For example, consider a physical process described by a function that maps to 0 for 
values of x less than n (where n is some arbitrarily large value), but maps to 2x for values 
of a: greater than or equal to n. If we consider only an initial segment of the sequence, we 
will be led to infer, using the limiting value of the relative frequency as our guide, that the 
probability of f(x) resulting in 0 is 1. If n is so large that it is impossible for anyone to 
observe n actual instances of this process, then there is no way to infer the true relative 
frequency of 0 with respect to the process. Further, infinitely many hypotheses about / 
are compatible with the relative frequency that we observe. We might hypothesize that 
f{x) = 3x; (Vx > n), or that f(x) = 4x; (Vx > n), or that f{x) = 323467x; (Vx > n) or 
even that (n < Vx < 2n)(/(x) = 3x); (Vx > 2n)(/(x) = 30x). All of these hypotheses, 
"Wittgenstein 1975 §234. 
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and many others, are compatible with the observed sequence. 
This is a serious problem for von Mises, one which Reichenbach avoids by defining 
probability merely with respect to a sufficiently long series of trials: 
If a sequence of roulette results or of mortality statistics were to show a no-
ticeable convergence only after billions of elements, we could not use it for 
the application of probability concepts, since its domain of convergence would 
be inaccessible to human experience. However, should one of the sequences 
converge "reasonably" within the domain accessible to human observation and 
diverge for all its infinite rest, such divergence would not disturb us; we should 
find that a semiconvergent sequence satisfies sufficiently all the rules of proba-
bility. I will introduce the termpractical limit for sequences that, in dimensions 
accessible to human observation, converge sufficiently and remain within the 
interval of convergence.12 
Reichenbach considers the possibility of redefining the probability calculus with respect 
to finite sequences; he concludes, however, that while this is possible, "a calculus of this 
kind would be rather complicated and cumbersome."13 Thus he regards the definition of 
the calculus in terms of infinite sequences as an idealization, analogous to the idealization 
of practical geometry by ideal geometry. 
Wittgenstein's Logical Interpretation 
Wittgenstein did not write very much on the topic of probability, however the little that 
he did write14 has been highly influential in the general development of the so-called logical 
interpretation of probability. The main sources for Wittgenstein's views are propositions 
5.1 - 5.156 of the Tractatus (his early period), and also §§225 - 237 of the Philosophical 
Remarks (his middle period). Like Laplace, Wittgenstein's notion of probability is epis-
temic: the probability of a proposition depends on our knowledge situation at the time the 
12Reichenbach 1949, 347 
13Reichenbach 1949,348. 
14The little that we have of his views on the subject come from a few short pages of the Tractatus, some 
'remarks' from the 1930's, and informal conversations with the Vienna Circle during the same decade. 
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statement is made. For Wittgenstein, probability represents a relation between proposi-
tions: between the propositions representative of our knowledge and the propositions for 
which we are seeking to fix a probability value to. It is easiest to understand Wittgenstein's 
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Now consider the proposition &. We can view it as a truth function, and like any other 
function, it accepts a number of arguments as input (here given in the first three columns) 
and produces a determinate output. Now call the truth grounds of a proposition the truth 
values of its truth arguments which make it true.15 The rows on which & is true are the 
rows 1-7. Therefore the set of its truth grounds is: { {T,T,T}, {T,T,F}, {T,F,T}, 
{T,F,F}, {F,T:T}, {F,T,F}, {F, F,T} }. Similarly, the truth grounds of £ are on 
lines 3-4,7-8: { {T, F, T}, {T, F, F}, {F, F, T}, {F, F, F} }.16 Now if we compare the 
truth grounds of these two propositions, we find that the truth grounds of J2 and 3? overlap. 
But we can ask the question, 'given &, when is «S true?' & is true on lines 1-7 for a total 
of seven instances. In the context of these seven lines, i? is true three times (on lines 3, 
4, and 7). So we can say that £H is true 3/7 of the time whenever & is true; i.e., we can 
calculate the conditional probability: P{£\0P) - 3/7 « .4286. 
In general, we can say that: "If Tr is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition 
V , and if Trs is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition V that are at the same 
time truth-grounds of V , then we call the ratio Trs : Tr the degree of probability that 
15Wittgenstein 2005, 5.101. 
16Strictly speaking, J2, takes only one argument. Since the truth-values of A and C are irrelevant, however, 
including them has no effect. 
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the proposition V gives to the proposition 's'".17 When two propositions have no truth 
arguments in common, the probability of one given the other is simply 1/2. For example, 
A, B, and C above have no truth arguments in common, and we can see from the truth 
table that P(A\B) = P(B\A) = P(A\C) = P{C\A) = P{B\C) = P(C\B) = 0.5. 
The truth-grounds of a proposition can be said to define a proposition's range. Wittgen-
stein writes, "The truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open 
to the facts. ... "18. Consider the truth table above once again, and imagine that the totality 
of our knowledge consists of the elementary propositions A, B, and C. We can say, then, 
that each line of the truth table represents a possible state description of the universe. For 
example, line 6 represents a possible state of the universe such that (~ AhBh ~ C). We 
can now define the range of the proposition =S as the state descriptions that are compatible 
with it. Further, we can say that J2 is logically equivalent to the disjunction of the state 
descriptions making up its range, i.e.: {Ah ~ BhC) V {Ah ~ Bh ~ C) V (~ Ah ~ 
BhC) V {~Ah~Bh~ C) 
Now for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, all non-elementary propositions are logi-
cally analyzable in principle into truth-functions of elementary propositions. Thus if we 
could perform such a complete analysis, then we could compute the probability of some 
proposition of unknown truth value simply by comparing its range with the total number of 
state descriptions that are left open by the other propositions which make up our knowledge 
situation. Thus imagine, for instance, that we know independently that the state description 
described by line 1 can be ruled out. Then in the case where we do not know the truth 
value of 0s, we can say that its probability given our knowledge situation is 6/7: it is true 
six out of seven times (i.e., true on lines 2-7 but false on line 8). Note how Wittgenstein's 
conception is similar to Laplace's. Both view probability as a ratio of 'favourable' cases 
to total possible cases. For Laplace, these are possible outcomes; for Wittgenstein, these 
are truth grounds. But unlike Laplace's conception, which is absolute, Wittgenstein's ba-
17Wittgenstein 2005, 5.15 
18Wittgenstein 2005,4.463 
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sic conception of probability is conditional. Wittgenstein has no need of the principle of 
insufficient reason. Whether a statement of unknown truth value is true or false is not sim-
ply assumed to be equally likely - its possibility is determined by its relation to the other 
statements making up our knowledge situation. Thus for Laplace, we 'divide our igno-
rance' into equally possible cases expressing absolute probabilities. For Wittgenstein, this 
possibility itself is conditional upon our knowledge. 
One might question the usefulness, however, of an interpretation of probability that 
requires us to completely analyze our propositions into elementary propositions. While 
this may be acceptable for an idealized logical language, the analysis of propositions in 
natural or even scientific language is notoriously difficult.19. However, we can address this 
concern if we consider the following example. Wittgenstein asks us to imagine the case of 
an urn into which we place an equal number of white and black balls. If I now ask, "what 
is the probability of drawing a white ball from this urn?", the answer will invariably be 1/2. 
Why? Wittgenstein's answer is the following "... if I say, 'The probability of my drawing 
a white ball is equal to the probability of my drawing a black one', this means that all the 
circumstances that I know of (including the laws of nature assumed as hypotheses) give no 
more probability to the occurrence of the one event than to that of the other. ...".20 
The key phrase here, ironically, is the one in parentheses.21 Thus imagine the set of all 
(not necessarily elementary) propositions whose truth value is known. Call this set the bulk 
of our knowledge, Jff. Now, for Wittgenstein, the proposition (P D (Q V R)) can belong 
to Jif even though neither P nor Q nor R belong to Jff. This may seem strange at first, but 
that this is possible follows from Wittgenstein's views on quantification. For Wittgenstein, 
quantified sentences are not propositions; rather, they are merely schemas or prototypes for 
constructing propositions. For example, he writes: "I dissociate the concept all from truth-
19Cf. Black 1966,256. 
20Wittgenstein 2005, 5.154 
21
 My interpretation is similar to that given in von Wright, 1969. However, I disagree with von Wright's 
negative evaluation of Wittgenstein's views on the probability of hypotheses. 
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functions ...", and also: "What is peculiar to the generality-sign is first, that it indicates a 
logical prototype, and secondly, that it gives prominence to constants";23 "The generality-
sign occurs as an argument.";24 "An hypothesis is a law for forming propositions."25 
For example, the proposition: 'If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal' is an 
instance of the rule specified by the hypothesis: 'All men are mortal'. But for Wittgenstein, 
only the former sentence is truly a proposition. The latter is merely a schema. Thus if 
we hold a certain law of nature to be true, e.g., (VX)(AX D Bx), then this law itself will 
not belong to Jff; however, all propositions capable of being constructed from it, e.g.: 
(Aa D Ba), (Ab D Bh), (Ac D Bc),..., will belong to W; and this will be the case even if 
the truth-values of Aa, Ab, Ac, Ba, Bb, Bc,... are unknown. 
Thus it is possible to have knowledge of a non-elementary proposition without having 
knowledge of its constituents; for the knowledge of such propositions is derived from our 
general laws and not built up from elementary propositions. The hypothetical general laws 
provide a means to add propositions expressing relations between propositions (elementary 
or not) to Jf without actually adding knowledge of these propositions themselves to <%". 
But if we can 'know' a proposition without knowing the truth or falsity of its constituents, 
then we can compute probabilities based on these unanalysed propositions as well. This is 
Wittgenstein's meaning when he writes: "It is in this way that probability is a generaliza-
tion. It involves a general description of a propositional form. We use probability only in 
default of certainty - if our knowledge of a fact is not indeed complete, but we do know 
something about its form. ..."26 
Coming back to the urn example, say that it is a law of nature that 'for all urns contain-
ing an equal number of white and black balls, all balls drawn will be either white or a black' 
(where 'or' is, of course, taken in the exclusive sense), or symbolically: (Vxeu){Wx © Bx). 
22Wittgenstein 2005, 5.521. 
"Wittgenstein 2005,5.522. 
24Wittgenstein 2005, 5.523. 
"Wittgenstein 1975, §228. 
26Wittgenstein 2005, 5.156. 
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This implies that for this particular draw, that (Wa © Ba). Now consider the proposi-
tion expressing the fact that I draw a white ball, (Wa). The probability conferred on this 
proposition by (Wa © Ba) is 1/2 (all else being equal). Note that we have calculated this 
probability in spite of the fact that we do not know either Wa or Ba. 
Note also that it is not necessary for either Wa or Ba themselves to be elementary 
propositions. These, in turn, may be complex, representing a conjunction, perhaps, of el-
ementary propositions. The laws of nature (which are simply assumed, a priori), tell us 
something about the relationships between propositions, and in describing these relation-
ships, they of course must describe the constituents of these relationships - but these need 
not be described in every detail for we do not need to know what the constituents of these 
constituents are; these constituents can represent 'abstractions', in a sense. Thus, these 
laws of nature express relationships between (possibly complex) propositions. These laws 
constitute the framework by which we describe the world;27 they form the 'a priori' as-
sumptions that we hold in the background when we make any statement of probability. 
Of course, as our knowledge grows, we may learn more about the constituents of these 
propositions, and this will, in turn, affect our calculated probabilities. Thus assume that 
JT consists of the single proposition, (P D (Q V R)). Given that I know this proposition, 
but not P, Q, or R, the probability that this proposition confers on the proposition R is 
4/7. Now assume that as our knowledge grows we eventually add Q to Jt'. In this new 
situation, the probability of R becomes 1/2. And if, one day, we discover that Q is capable 
of further analysis, and we come to know the truth or falsity of one of its constituents, say, 
qi, this will affect the probability of R even further. 
Now as we have seen in the previous section, observed relative frequencies can have 
no direct bearing, for Wittgenstein, on the calculation of probabilities. By themselves, 
they show nothing, for as he says, they 'leave the time open'. Relative frequencies can 
have a role to play with regard to probabilities, however, in an indirect way; i.e., they can 
27Cf. Wittgenstein 2005,6.342 
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inspire us to formulate new hypothetical laws of nature.28 But aside from a warning that 
our hypotheses should not be ad hoc29 (i.e., not directly copied from statements of relative 
frequency) Wittgenstein says nothing with regards to how this 'inspiration' is supposed to 
work. For this, we turn to Carnap. 
Carnap's Probabilityi and Probability2 
Carnap's views on probability are best described as an attempt at reconciling the fre-
quency and logical interpretations. He observes that: 
It has repeatedly occurred in the history of science that a vehement but fu-
tile controversy arose between the proponents of two or more explicata who 
shared the erroneous belief that they had the same explicandum; when finally 
it became clear that they meant different explicanda, unfortunately designated 
by the same term, and that the different explicata were hence compatible and 
moreover were found to be equally fruitful scientific concepts, the controversy 
evaporated into nothing.30 
For Carnap, the two conceptions of probability are defined as: (i) probabilityi: the 
degree of confirmation of an hypothesis, (ii) probability: the relative frequency in the long 
run. Both probability! and probability2 are thought of as functions; each of which take a 
distinct type of argument: probabilityi is a function operating on sentences (which express 
propositions), while probability2 is a function that operates on "properties, kinds, classes, 
usually of events or things."31 Since probabilityi operates on sentences in a language, it 
does not, strictly speaking, say anything about the actual facts. Elementary statements 
of probabilityi are determined to be true or false solely through logical analysis (this is 
analogous to Wittgenstein's conception of probability as a relation between propositions). 
Nevertheless, it is important for probabilityi statements to refer to the facts, via sentences 





describing a body of evidence. A probability! statement is, in fact, a measure of the support 
that the evidence, e, gives to the hypothesis, h. That is, when we say that the probabilityi 
of h with respect to e is high, we mean that e gives strong support to h. Symbolically, this 
is expressed as c(h, e), or in words: the degree of confirmation of h, a hypothesis, with 
respect to the evidence e. 
Now we can quantify a probabilityi statement, according to Carnap, in terms of a 'fair 
betting quotient', and this is how the link between probabilityi and probability2 is drawn.32 
Consider the following, somewhat light-hearted example: suppose there are two persons, 
call them Eric and Linda, and suppose that they agree to bet on whether a cat (call him 
Silvy) is or is not a six-toed cat. Now suppose further that Eric and Linda have unlimited 
funds and that Eric bets u\ and Linda bets u2 (where u\, u2 > 0). Call q = u\/(u\ + u2) the 
betting quotient. If we let e be the information concerning Silvy that both Eric and Linda 
share (that in spite of his name, he is a tom-cat), then we say that probabilityi = Q if Eric 
and Linda's bet is a fair bet, given e. 
Now to clarify the notion of a fair bet, imagine that Eric and Linda make a whole class 
of similar bets on each member of the set of tom-cats with female-sounding names (of 
which Silvy is merely one). Now suppose, for the sake of argument, that there are 100 
such cats, and that the actual relative frequency, r, of six-toed cats in this population is .25. 
In this case, Eric will win rn = 0.25 x 100 = 25 of these bets and lose the remaining 
(1 — r)n x 100 = 75 of them. Say that Eric wagers $1.00 on each cat, and that Linda 
wagers $3.00. Eric will win a total of rnu2 = 25 x $3 = $75.00 from Linda. He will lose 
the remaining 75 bets, of course, for a loss of $75.00 (he bets $1.00 on each). Thus after all 
the betting is done, both Eric and Linda will break even, and this represents the situation in 
which a bet on any particular cat in this population is a fair bet. To see why we call this a 
fair bet, suppose that we tell Eric and Linda the actual value of r (i.e., 0.25). Would it be 
rational, now, for Eric to wager $2.00 on each cat? In this case, q — ^ = 0.4 > r. He 
32Carnap 1962,165-168. 
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will still win rnu2 = $75.00 from Linda, but he will now lose 75 x $2 = $150.00 for a net 
loss of $75.00. In general, when q > r, Eric will refuse to make such a bet, for such a bet 
is not fair. Similarly for Linda, she will refuse to make a bet if q < r. It is only when q = r 
that we call this a fair bet. But now recall that probability! = q when the bet is fair, and 
that probability2 = r. Thus in the case of a fair bet, probabilityi = probability2. 
Now suppose that neither Eric nor Linda knows r (i.e., that r is not contained in e).33 
In order to arrive at a fair betting quotient, Eric and Linda will require that the probability! 
of Silvy being six-toed represents an estimate, r', of the actual unknown relative frequency, 
r, of six-toed cats, given the evidence, e. And just as for the case when the actual relative 
frequency is known, neither Eric nor Linda will make a bet unless q = r', where r' is the 
best estimate available of r given e. I will end here and will not go into the details of 
Carnap's procedure for the actual estimation of the relative frequency given the available 
evidence. This would take us deep into the problem of induction and that is not the subject 
of my thesis. But the foregoing should be sufficient for elucidating the relationship which, 
according to Carnap, holds between the two conceptions of probability. 
The relation between probability2 and probability! is hence seen to be a spe-
cial instance of the logical relation which holds generally between an empiri-
cal, e.g., physical, quantitative concept and the corresponding inductive-logical 
concept of its estimate with respect to given evidence. This relation explains, 
on the one hand, the different nature of the two probability concepts, but, on 
the other hand, also the far-reaching analogy between them which we shall 
repeatedly observe in our further discussions.34 
Popper's Propensity Interpretation 
Popper originally ascribed to a frequentist interpretation of probability, but eventually 
came to reject this view in favour of the propensity interpretation, and he gives us the 
following consideration in order to show why. Consider our old friend again, the biased 
33Cf. Carnap 1962, 168-175. 
34Carnap 1962, 173. 
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die, and imagine that, after many experiments, we come to determine the relative frequency 
of 6 for the sequence of rolls with this die to be 1/4. Now imagine that we modify the 
sequence slightly: suppose that it consists of a large number of throws with the biased die, 
mixed in with a few throws (two or three) with an unbiased die. Now the probability of 
rolling a 6 for each of these few throws with the unbiased die is clearly 1/6, even though 
"these throws are, according to our assumptions, members of a sequence of throws with the 
statistical frequency 1/4.35 
Now the obvious response is that when we say that the probability of 6 with respect 
to the unbiased die is 1/6, we have simply narrowed the reference class. It is analogous 
to saying that the probability of senility for men over 40 is 0.000003, while it is 0.03 for 
men over 90 (I am making up these numbers, of course). With respect to the original 
sequence we simply choose not to take account of the physical differences of the two dice 
when defining our reference class. But we know, say, based on the observation of previous 
experiments with an unbiased die, that the probability with respect to this sequence is 
1/6. Thus we can say that (i) p('6'\b) = 1/4 (where b is the mixed class), but that 
(ii) p(i6,\bc) = 1/6 (where c is the subclass of throws with a correct die). Now Popper 
writes: 
Of course there is no doubt as to the compatibility of the two equations ... nor 
is there any question that these two cases can be realised within the frequency 
theory: we might construct some sequence b such that equation (i) is satisfied, 
while in a selection sequence be - a very long and virtually infinite sequence 
whose elements belong both to b and c - equation (ii) is satisfied. But our case 
is not of this kind. For be is not, in our case, a virtually infinite sequence. It 
contains, according to our assumptions, at most three elements. In be the six 
may come up not at all, or once, or twice, or three times. But it certainly will 
not occur with the frequency 1/6 in the sequence be because we know that this 
sequence contains at most three elements.36 
Thus in order to determine that p('6'|6c) = 1/6 we must interpret c as being a long 
35Popper 1959. 31-32 
36Popperl959,33. 
50 
sequence of throws with a correct die, and "we estimate or conjecture that, in a sequence of 
throws with a correct die, the six will come up in 1/6 of the cases."37 According to Popper, 
this forces the frequency theorist to introduce a slight modification to his interpretation 
stipulating what can count as an admissible sequence. The frequency theorist will have to 
say that only those sequences "which are characterized by a set of generating conditions -
by a set of conditions whose repeated realisation produces the elements of the sequence"38 
are admissible. In this case, b is no longer an admissible sequence. "Its main part, which 
consists only of throws with the loaded die, will make an admissible sequence, and no 
question arises with respect to it. The other part, be, consists of throws with a regular die, 
and belongs to a virtual sequence c - also an admissible one - of such throws. There is again 
no problem here. It is clear that, once the modification has been adopted, the frequency 
interpretation is no longer in any difficulty."39 But if we make this modification, then we 
have made the transition from the frequency interpretation to the propensity interpretation; 
for if the sequence is defined by the set of its generating conditions, probability "may now 
be said to be a property of the generating conditions^ And if we say that, then we must 
view the generating conditions as having a certain disposition, or propensity to generate 
sequences with frequencies equal to the probabilities. 
For Popper, a probability statement is interpreted as a real physical tendency, or propen-
sity - we could also call it a potential - for the experimental setup under investigation to give 
rise to a particular result. Given that a propensity is a real property of the experimental con-
ditions (analogous to a force), probability statements express propensities that can influence 
experimental results, interfere with one another, and most importantly: they can be objec-
tively tested. In Popper's colourful language, a propensity can be 'kicked', and it can 'kick 
back'. He illustrates this by means of a 'pinboard',41 i.e.: 





 Popper 1982,72. 
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Say, for example, that we throw a number of balls down this (symmetrical) board. After 
a sufficient number of trials, the balls will accumulate at the bottom of the board and form 
a normal distribution curve, which we will say represents the probability distribution curve 
for a single experiment. Now suppose we 'kick' the board by slightly tilting it counter-
clockwise. In this case, we will also kick the propensities: the probability distribution for 
a single case will be biased in favour of the left end of the board; and the propensities 
will 'kick back': the shape of the pile at the bottom of the board will be different. On 
the other hand, suppose we remove one of the pins. This will again alter the probability 
distribution curve - and since the curve represents the probability distribution for each ball 
that rolls down, it will alter the probability for every single experiment, whether or not the 
ball comes close to the removed pin. We can also ask, for example, what the probability 
distribution curve is for a ball, given that it hits a specific pin on its way down. Importantly, 
any hypothesis we make about the distribution curve can be tested by means of repeated 
experiments. I will have more to say about the propensity interpretation below. 
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2.2 Hempel's Inductive-Statistical Model of Explanation 
But let us come back, now, to our primary topic: explanation, and let us now consider 
the case of probabilistic or statistical explanation: where we wish to explain the occurrence 
of a phenomenon that we cannot (although perhaps in principle we could) predict with 
certainty. Now just like the case of D-N explanation, Hempel's Inductive-Statistical (I-S) 
model takes the form of an argument; however the inference in this case is inductive, not 
deductive. We can represent I-S explanations as follows: 
p(R, S) is close to 1 
[makes practically certain] 
Rj 
Here, p(R, S) is a sentence expressing a probabilistic law. The probability expressed in 
this sentence is a statistical probability, interpreted according to the frequentist interpreta-
tion. It asserts that the relative frequency of the property R with respect to the population S 
tends toward 1 in the long run. Unlike the case for D-N explanations, the explanans state-
ments in I-S explanations do not logically entail the explanandum statement. Rather, they 
confer a degree of confirmation on the explanandum statement (represented by the double-
line). The degree of confirmation expresses a logical probability.42 Logical probability, as 
we saw above, is a relation between sentences. It is the degree of confirmation, or inductive 
support, conferred on a hypothesis, H, by the body of knowledge, K, and it is represented 
by c(H, K). In the case of I-S explanation, this relation expresses the extent to which the 
explanandum statement is confirmed by the explanans. Thus, another way of representing 
the I-S schema would be as follows: 
p(R,S) = r 
S, 
c(Rj,Sj) — r 
42
 Cf. Hempel 1966,310. 
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Strictly speaking, an I-S argument is not an argument for the explanandum statement 
itself, but merely an argument for the degree of inductive support that we have for it. We 
are not permitted to detach E. We take the extra step and say that an I-S argument is a good 
explanation for the explanandum statement when the degree of confirmation is high (« 1); 
i.e., when the explanandum is to be expected given the explanans. 
For example, let Sj represent the fact that Joanne Jones has a streptococcus infection, 
Pj the fact that Joanne has been administered penicillin, and Rj the fact that Joanne has 
recovered from her illness. If the relative frequency of R with respect to S and P tends 
toward the limit of, say, .95 in the long run, then we can give an I-S explanation of Joanne's 
actual recovery as follows: 
p(R, S • P) = .95 
bj • Pj 
.95 
Rj 
But consider a variation on the foregoing example: suppose that Joanne has a penicillin-
resistant strain of streptococcus, S*; thus, her probability of recovering is actually close to 
0, and we can present an I-S argument for her non-recovery (R) like so: 
p(R, S* • P) is close to 1 
S; • Pi 
_ [makes practically certain] 
Rj 
We now have two arguments, both of which have true premises (which are mutu-
ally consistent), that confer high inductive support to mutually contradictory conclusions. 
Whether Joanne recovers or not, we can argue that the outcome was to be expected. But 
such a result serves to make all so-called I-S 'explanations' seem rather dubious, and it 
makes them utterly useless for the purposes of prediction. 
Hempel's solution is the requirement of maximal specificity (RMS). According to RMS, 
the probabilistic laws invoked must be specified relative to the most specific reference class 
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available given a knowledge situation, K. Thus, an I-S argument for Joanne's recovery that 
does not take into account the fact that her infection is resistant to penicillin is not sufficient 
to explain her recovery. 
More formally: let s be the conjunction of the statements in the explanans. If there is a 
sentence, k, which is entailed by our knowledge situation, K, such that s • k implies that the 
case under consideration belongs to a subset, F\, of the original reference class, F , and if 
p(G, F\) ^ p(G, F), then RMS requires us to consider the more restricted reference class, 
F-i, unless p(G, Fj) amounts to a theorem of probability theory (the latter qualification is 
there to guard against assigning Joanne to the reference class of persons who have recovered 
from streptococcus infections in order to explain the fact that she has recovered from her 
streptococcus infection. In that case, we would have p(R,R • P), which is, of course, 
trivially equal to 1 (recall, also, von Mises' criticisms of single-case probabilities)).43 
But there are additional problems. Consider the following case.44 Say that a teaspoon 
of salt has a .95 probability of completely dissolving after five minutes when stirred into a 
bowl of cold water. Now imagine that I do not know this, and that I form the hypothesis that 
all salt which has been placed under a magician's spell has the probability .95 of dissolving 
in a similar manner. I perform experiments on various samples (using various magicians). 
Lo and behold, my hypothesis is confirmed: the relative frequency of dissolved samples 
tends toward the limit of .95 in the long run. I then check for a more specific reference 
class. I find none that affect the relative frequency. I therefore feel confident that the salt 
sample dissolved because it was hexed. Surely, however, the statistical law is irrelevant to 
the explanation in spite of its being confirmed by the evidence, and in spite of there being 
no more maximally specific reference class. 
Another problem is I-S's inability to explain low-probability outcomes. For example, 
in quantum mechanics, there is a known law for the probability of a single instance of 
alpha decay in a U238 atom. It seems as though we can explain why alpha decay occurs by 
43See:Hempel 1965,400. 
44Cf. Curd & Cover, 786. 
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appealing to this law. But on Hempel's account, since the probability of alpha decay is so 
small, the degree of confirmation we can confer on the explanandum is not high enough to 
be used in an I-S explanation of it. Thus alpha-decay cannot cannot be explained at all. 
2.3 Probabilistic Explanation According to the D-N-P Model 
Let us consider how the D-N-P model handles these examples. With regards to the 
irrelevance cases, Railton makes it a requirement that the probability laws must be true; i.e., 
that they describe genuinely indeterministic processes (statistical generalizations are ruled 
out) that give rise to the phenomenon, and that they are derivable from our best scientific 
theories.45 Thus since the mechanism is responsible for the phenomenon, it is obviously 
relevant to the phenomenon. The problem of maximal specificity also does not arise, for 
the laws, by their very nature, are maximally specific (they truly describe the phenomenon 
in every respect). 
As for the low probability cases, recall that for Railton, the requirement is not to give 
a good reason to expect, but to give an account of the mechanism which gives rise to an 
outcome; an explanation of a phenomenon is an explanation of how it came about. Recall 
the schema of a D-N-P explanation: 
(1) A complete theoretical account of the mechanism involved in the production of the 
phenomenon described by the explanandum statement, and a derivation, from our 
theory, of the laws required to infer the probability of occurrence of the explanandum 
phenomenon, E. 
(2) A D-N argument from the laws derived in (1) to the probability of occurrence of E. 
(3) A statement to the effect that E actually did occur. 46 
The role of the D-N portion of the D-N-P text is merely to infer a probability for the 
event to occur. But unlike the I-S model, the probability inferred cannot be understood as 
45Cf. Railton 1978,222. 
46Cf. Railton 1978, 214, 218. 
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the degree of confirmation. Its role is not to show that the explanandum event was to be 
expected; rather, its role is to elucidate the probabilistic mechanism behind the occurrence 
of the phenomenon. Thus a probabilistic D-N-P explanation shows us how it is that there 
is a particular probability for a phenomenon to occur, and then by means of the parenthetic 
addendum, tells us that, by the way, it did occur. But now in order to show how the mech-
anism gave rise (however improbably) to the the explanandum event, we need to interpret 
the probability that we infer as a physical probability - in other words, as a propensity. A 
propensity, as we saw above, is a real property of a physical system. It is the disposition 
of one particular state of a physical system to give rise to a later state of the same system. 
Thus if I say that the probability that a die turns up 6 on a particular roll is 1/6,1 am saying 
that the propensity for the die to turn up 6 is 1/6; I am saying that it is a real property of this 
die in this instance47 that it has an equal chance of landing on any face. Railton needs to 
interpret single-case probabilities as propensities because rather than simply saying that the 
low-probability occurrence of the explanandum event is inexplicable, he wants to say that 
the explanandum event is somehow tied to the inferred probability - that it results from it 
- and a propensity interpretation of probability can give us this link. For on the propensity 
interpretation, these probabilities can cause the explanandum event: 
Under & propensity interpretation, probability has the characteristics sought: a 
probability is the expression of the strength of a physical tendency in an indi-
vidual chance system to produce a particular outcome; it is therefore straight-
forwardly applicable to single cases; and it is (in a relevant sense) causally 
responsible for that outcome whenever it is realized.48 
Propensities are certainly able to do the job that Railton needs them to do. However, 
there are certain problems. For one, a propensity interpretation of probability is probably 
incompatible with the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Indeed, part of 
the motivation for the propensity interpretation in the first place was what Popper saw as the 
47
 Strictly speaking it is a property of the physical system, including my hand, the table, etc., of which the 
die is merely a part. 
48Railton 1978,222. 
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problems with the Copenhagen interpretation: "I had always been convinced that the prob-
lem of the interpretation of the quantum theory was closely linked with the problem of the 
interpretation of probability theory in general, and that the Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation 
was the result of a subjectivist interpretation of probability".49 As I will explain in much 
more detail in the next chapter, the irreducibly probabilistic nature of atomic phenomena 
results, on the Copenhagen interpretation, from the impossibility of fully separating the 
measuring instrument from the object being measured in our characterization of the results 
of experiments. On the Copenhagen interpretation, this means that the role of the observer 
- a subjective element - can never be fully eliminated in the atomic domain (unlike the 
case for the macro domain of classical physics). But on Popper's view the uncertainty is 
interpreted, not as resulting from the intrusion of the subject, but as a real property of the 
experimental setup. "Probability fields are physical, even though they depend on, or are rel-
ative to, specified experimental conditions."50 Further, the wave-particle duality of atomic 
phenomena which, as we will see in the next chapter, is at the heart of the Copenhagen 
interpretation is rejected by Popper. On Popper's view, a particle description of atomic 
phenomena is actually the only one that is valid. The 'waves' are seen as probability fields, 
interpreted as propensity fields. 
Of course they may in their turn become objects of study, just like other phys-
ical properties, such as the momentum of a particle. As we have seen, they 
may even be objects which one can kick and which can kick back. There is, 
however, no duality in any sense in which we may speak either of a particle or 
of a wave but not both at once - exactly as there is no duality between a particle 
and its momentum that prevents us from speaking of both at the same time.51 
I am not going to undertake a defence the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum me-
chanics here, but I will note that Railton, defending the view that it is possible to explain 





I take it that quantum mechanics, under the dominant interpretation, gives us 
reason to think that there are irreducibly probabilistic processes in nature, and 
that they are governed by probabilistic and non-probabilistic laws. ... If the 
dominant interpretation of quantum mechanics is right, there are no "hidden 
variables" characterizing unknown initial conditions of nuclei that suffice, in 
conjunction with deterministic laws, to account for the occurrences of alpha-
decay ...52 
Unless Railton is mistaken with regard to what the dominant interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics is, I take it that he means the Copenhagen interpretation. If so, then given 
that almost all of the examples that Railton uses to illustrate his D-N-P model have to do 
with atomic processes, we must question whether he is actually being consistent or not. 
One might answer, of course, that Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics aside, perhaps the Copenhagen interpretation is actually compatible with the propensity 
interpretation of probability. However the propensity interpretation of probability itself, 
as Railton admits53, is notoriously difficult. It is not clear, exactly, what the relationship 
between propensities and the probability calculus is. As Humphreys has shown,54 propensi-
ties are asymmetrical while the probabilities used in the traditional probability calculus are 
not. Since propensities are causal; it makes no sense to speak of the propensity for a state 
to have arisen from a previous state. Humphreys suggests, in fact, that we throw out the 
probability calculus and start anew with propensities; I think, however, that this is a touch 
extreme. Further, a marriage of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics with 
the propensity interpretation of probability would be most awkward, to say the least, for as 
I will explain in the next chapter, on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
it makes no sense at all, strictly speaking, to describe atomic phenomena causally. 
I do not think it is necessary to commit ourselves to a propensity interpretation of prob-
ability for the purposes of giving an account of scientific explanation. Propensities allow 
us to explain why a particular atom improbably undergoes alpha-decay (it is 'because' it 
52Railton 1981,234. 
"Railton 1978,222. 
54Cf. Humphreys 1985. 
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had a propensity, however small, to do so). But what do we really lose if we give this up? 
We have, after all, explained why there was such-and-such a probability for this event to 
occur, and using this fact we can explain why this particular sample of Uranium has such-
and-such a half life. Why not just say that we are unable to explain, causally at least, this 
particular occurrence of alpha-decay? As Kitcher writes (referring to the Schrodinger wave 
equation): "Conjoin as many as you like of the propositions that occur in this derivation 
or consider the entire derivation. Whatever your choice, you will not have shown why e2 
tunnelled through, rather than being reflected, or why e2, rather than el5 tunnelled through. 
For what those why-questions ask is for a specification of the differences between electrons 
that tunnel through and electrons that are reflected, and it is, of course, part of character of 
[quantum mechanics] that there are no such differences to be found".55 At the very least 
we should hedge our bets. If propensities can be made clear, and if they can be applied to 
quantum mechanical phenomena, so much the better for our account of explanation. Until 
such time, however, I think it is best to suspend judgement. This does not undermine, to my 
mind, the D-N-P. For again, we have explained why the atomic event had the probability to 
occur that it did. 
We are coming near, now, to the end of our discussion. It will be useful again, before 
moving on, to survey the ground we have covered so far. I argued in the first chapter that 
Railton's D-N-P model of explanation holds great promise as a model capable of accommo-
dating both causal and pragmatic concerns, but that its commitment to hard reductionism 
was unnecessary and could be dropped. In this chapter, I showed how Railton's D-N-P 
model is able to overcome many of the counter-examples to Hempel's theory, and I ex-
plained that due to his desire to account for explanations of improbable events, Railton is 
forced to embrace a propensity interpretation of probability. I argued, however, that an ac-
count of explanation should not commit itself to such a controversial thesis - especially one 
that seems to be at odds with much of the explaining that quantum physicists actually do. 
55Kitcher 1989,451. 
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The price of dropping the propensity interpretation may be that we have to forego causal 
explanations of irreducibly indeterministic phenomena, but I argued that this price is not 
so steep as it may seem. Further, as I will show in detail in the next chapter, there are no 
causal explanations of irreducibly indeterministic phenomena, at least not according to the 
dominant interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
But if the Copenhagen interpretation is incompatible with a causal interpretation of 
atomic phenomena, then does this not undermine the basic motivation behind the D-N-P 
model? Recall that the principal requirement of the D-N-P model is to elucidate the mech-
anism behind the occurrence of some phenomenon, and when one speaks of a mechanism 
one usually speaks of a causal mechanism. But as I pointed out above when I introduced 
the D-N-P model, Railton himself does not actually impose a causal requirement. 
... it will not do simply to add to the D-N model a requirement that the ex-
planans contain causes whenever the explanandum is a particular fact. First, 
some particular facts may be explained non-causally, e.g., by subsumption un-
der structural laws such as the Pauli exclusion principle. Second, even where 
causal explanation is called for, the existence of general, causal laws that cover 
the explanandum has not always been sufficient for explanation: the search for 
explanation has also taken the form of a search for mechanisms that underlie 
these laws.56 
My disagreement with Railton is not over whether or not there are non-causal expla-
nations. Both of us agree that there are. Rather, my disagreement with Railton is over the 
extent to which non-causal explanations exist in science. Railton holds that explanations 
of irreducibly probabilistic processes (i.e., those given in quantum mechanics) are actually 
causal in nature; thus he requires a propensity interpretation of probability in order to to 
interpret those low probabilities objectively and to thus have a notion of the cause of an im-
probable atomic event. I, on the other hand, deny that explanations of atomic phenomena 
are causal (at least according to the Copenhagen interpretation), and therefore I deny that 
we need to commit ourselves to a propensity interpretation of probability. But whatever 
56Railton 1978,207. 
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view one takes on the causal or non-causal status of atomic phenomena, the D-N-P (minus 
the commitment to propensities) is compatible with that view. 
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Chapter 3 
Explanations of Atomic Phenomena 
This last chapter will take the form of an extended example. I will describe the charac-
terization of atomic processes as given by the dominant interpretation of the most success-
ful theory in physics: quantum mechanics. I will show how, according to the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, causality does not strictly speaking apply to atomic 
phenomena. As well, I will show how the Copenhagen interpretation presents us with one 
more reason to reject the extreme reductionistic view of science that I argued against in 
chapter 1. 
3.1 The Genesis of Quantum Mechanics 
When we subject certain objects to extremely high temperatures, they absorb energy 
and emit light (picture a blacksmith hammering metal in a forge; if the temperature is high 
enough, the metal becomes 'red hot' or 'white hot'). In order to study this phenomenon, 
\9th century physicists conceived of the notion of a 'black body' - a sort of idealization: 
a black body is a completely non-reflecting object that is capable of emitting radiation at 
an intensity directly proportional to the amount of energy it absorbs. Finding a theoretical 
model for this so-called 'black body radiation' was the problem that was to lead physicists 
down the road toward what is now known as quantum mechanics. At around the middle 
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of the century (1859-60), Kirchoff showed that the ratio of emitted to absorbed energy in 
these materials depended solely on the frequency and temperature, and not, for example, 
on the shape of the object or on the nature of the material from which it is made. He left 
it as a challenge for subsequent physicists to find a precise expression for the relationship 
between these quantities.1 
At the turn of the century, Planck narrowed down the problem by focusing attention not 
on the radiation per se, but on the radiating atoms making up the material (the so-called 
'oscillators'). He was able to devise a formula for the frequency-energy relationship, but it 
was one that was based on some very ad hoc assumptions;2 while the formula successfully 
described the experimental results, there was still the problem of finding an underlying 
physical basis for it. Planck approached this problem by borrowing ideas from Boltzmann's 
work in statistical thermodynamics: he hypothesized that the total energy of the system 
was distributed over a large collection of indistinguishable energy elements (oscillators). 
The result was the now famous formula: e = hv - i.e., the energy, s, in each element 
is equal to the constant of proportionality, h (Planck's constant), times the frequency, v. 
Curiously, his results implied that e must be given in integer multiples of hu. This result 
was unprecedented. Heisenberg speculates: 
... he must soon have found that his formula looked as if the oscillator could 
only contain discrete quanta of energy - a result that was so different from any-
thing known in classical physics that he certainly must have refused to believe 
it in the beginning. ... Planck must have realized at this time that his formula 
had touched the foundations of our description of nature ...3 
The discovery of Planck's constant (or the 'quantum of action' as it came to be known) 
was key to the resolution of some of the other outstanding problems in physics at the time. 
Thus as a result of his work on the photoelectric effect, Einstein, in 1905, was able to 
describe light in terms of energy quanta, and in 1907, as a result of his work on the specific 
'Cf. Baggott2004, 10. 
2Cf. Baggott2004, 12. 
3Heisenberg 1959,35. 
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heats of solid bodies, he did the same for atoms and ions. In 1913 Bohr published his theory 
of the atom, according to which electrons are confined to fixed orbits around the nucleus of 
an atom that depend on integer numbers counted outwards from the nucleus (the so-called 
'principal quantum numbers'). 
By 1924, de Broglie was able to relate Planck's relation e = hu with Einstein's mass-
energy equivalence relation, e = mc2. De Broglie reasoned that all moving particles, whose 
energy could be related to their mass (as expressed by Einstein's equation), also exhibited 
wave-like properties as described by Planck's equation (which was expressed in terms of 
frequency). This 'wave-particle duality' was only apparent in extremely small particles 
(e.g., photons and electrons) due to the small size of Planck's constant, but the effects were 
present in principle in macro-objects as well. 
1925 saw Schrodinger develop his famous wave equations for the variation in a quan-
tum system. The interpretation of the wave equation was a matter of some controversy, 
however: Schrodinger, who had realist sympathies, interpreted the wave function as a dis-
turbance in the electromagnetic field. In other words, for Schrodinger, the elementary par-
ticles were not actually particles at all, but waves that manifested particle-like properties. 
Due to problems inherent in this description, however, Schrodinger's interpretation was not 
well received. Born, on the other hand, interpreted the wave equation as a probability v^avc. 
... Born's way of thinking represented a marked break with classical physics. 
Unlike Schrodinger, who wanted to invest an element of physical reality in 
the wave functions, Born argued that they are actually much more abstract. He 
envisaged the wave function as some kind of 'probability wave', with the mod-
ulus square of the wave function representing the measurable probability for 
particles in specific states. In other words, he believed that the wave function 
represents our knowledge of the state of the physical object. ... Born argued 
that wave mechanics tells us nothing about the state of two quantum particles 
(such as electrons) following a collision: we can use the theory only to ob-
tain probabilities for the various possible states resulting from the collision. ... 
quantum theory appeared to have no respect for the link between cause and 
effect.4 
"Baggott 2004, 34. 
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In 1927, Heisenberg formulated his famous 'uncertainty principle'. He showed that it 
is possible to measure either the position or the momentum of an elementary particle ac-
curately, but not both, and he illustrated his reasoning by means of the following thought 
experiment.5 Imagine we want to observe (through a microscope) the path, described by 
its position and momentum, of an electron travelling through space. Now to measure the 
position of the electron accurately we need to use high-frequency gamma rays. Frequency, 
however, is directly proportional to energy via Planck's relation e — hu. Thus as the fre-
quency of the beam increases, so does its intensity; the energy of the individual photons 
in that beam becomes very high. Now there is a phenomenon known as the Compton ef-
fect: when a high energy photon collides with an electron, the electron is 'jolted' (i.e., it is 
knocked off its path). But what this means is that making an accurate determination of the 
electron's position renders us incapable of likewise accurately determining its momentum; 
to determine its momentum we require the position of the electron at two points along its 
path. But since the path has been altered by the first position measurement, we cannot 
determine where the electron would have been had we not interfered with it. On the other 
hand, if we use light of a very low frequency in order to avoid the Compton effect, we 
can then determine the electron's momentum accurately (by measuring, for example, the 
Doppler effect). But in that case, due to the low frequency of the beam we cannot mea-
sure its position accurately. Using Bora's probabilistic interpretation of the wave function, 
Heisenberg was able to express the relationship between the uncertainties in position and 
momentum mathematically. He found that an exact determination of the position of the 
electron resulted in an infinite uncertainty in its velocity (and hence momentum), and vice 
versa. 
5Cf. Baggott 2004, 36-38. 
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3.2 Complementarity and the Copenhagen Interpretation 
While Bohr was in complete agreement with Heisenberg's conclusions, he took issue 
with Heisenberg's description of the experiment. Heisenberg's description assumes a parti-
cle interpretation of the electron and photon throughout, but for Bohr6 the uncertainty arises 
due to the limited applicability of the particle and wave descriptions themselves to quantum 
phenomena. Camilleri describes Bohr's disagreement with Heisenberg as follows: 
In his detailed conceptual analysis of the gamma-ray microscope, Bohr argued 
that when a beam of light impinges on an electron, the light must be concep-
tualized both as a particle and as a wave. In the first instance it is necessary 
to think of the interaction between the electron and light ray as an instance of 
Compton scattering, according to which a photon (or a light quantum) collid-
ing with the electron will be deflected at a given angle. However, the light 
quantum interpretation alone cannot explain the diffraction of the light beam, 
nor can it account for the resolving power of the microscope. According to 
classical optics, the diffracted beam of light is not scattered in a definite di-
rection, but rather spreads over a certain angle. In the gamma-ray microscope 
experiment, Bohr argued, the light ray 'spreads out' like a wave after inter-
acting with the electron, and therefore it is impossible to determine precisely 
at what angle the photon is scattered. ... For Bohr, it was not discontinuity 
of the interaction between the electron and the light quantum, but rather the 
wave-particle duality of light that prevents one from measuring the position 
and momentum of the electron with unlimited precision.7 
For Bohr, the problem is not that there is a particle - an electron or a photon - for which 
we would like to determine both position and momentum but cannot. Rather, for Bohr 
the uncertainty arises because with respect to one type of experiment we must assume a 
particle description of the phenomenon, while with respect to another type of experiment 
we must assume a wave description - but both of these (classical) descriptions are actually 
incompatible with each other; we can only measure a 'particle's' momentum if we assume 
that it is a wave; but a wave description makes it impossible to measure the 'particle's' 
position. And vice versa. 
6Heisenberg was later convinced of this as well. 
7Camilleri 2007,189. 
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The fundamental contrast between the quantum of action and the classical con-
cepts is immediately apparent from the simple formulae which form the com-
mon foundation of the theory of light quanta and of the wave theory of material 
particles. If Planck's constant be denoted by h, as is well known, 
Er = I\ = h,. . . (1) 
where E and I are energy and momentum respectively, T and A the correspond-
ing period of vibration and wave-length. In these formulae the two notions of 
light and also of matter enter in sharp contrast. While energy and momentum 
are associated with the concept of particles, and hence may be characterised 
according to the classical point of view by definite space-time co-ordinates, 
the period of vibration and wave-length refer to a plane harmonic wave train 
of unlimited extent in space and time.8 
In other words, Planck's constant relates, in each case (i.e., for light and matter), two 
strictly speaking incompatible quantities. In the first relation, E (energy) is associated with 
the concept of a particle, given in time and space, while r (period of vibration) is associated 
with a wave: a dynamic concept 'of unlimited extent', not conceptualizable with respect to 
space and time. Likewise for / and A. 
Now in the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics (i.e., matrix and wave me-
chanics), when we speak of the state of a quantum system, this system always includes the 
measuring instrument as an integral part; but if the phenomenon under investigation is the 
'object' and if the measuring instrument is the 'subject', then strictly speaking we cannot 
speak of a subject-object distinction in this context. For Bohr, this means that with respect 
to atomic phenomena there simply is no 'object' in the classical sense; for a distinction 
between the subject (represented by the measuring instrument), the object (electron, pho-
ton, etc.), and the way that the subject and object interact - which is necessary for the full 
determination of a thing - is impossible due to the very nature of the phenomena under 
investigation. 
Now the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena 
will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected. 
8Bohr 1928,581. 
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Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither 
be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation. After all, the 
concept of observation is in so far arbitrary as it depends upon which objects 
are included in the system to be observed. ... This situation has far-reaching 
consequences. On one hand, the definition of the state of a physical system, 
as ordinarily understood, claims the elimination of all external disturbances. 
But in that case, according to the quantum postulate, any observation will be 
impossible, and above all, the concepts of space and time lose their immediate 
sense. On the other hand, if in order to make observation possible we permit 
certain interactions with suitable agencies of measurement, not belonging to 
the system, an unambiguous definition of the state of the system is naturally no 
longer possible, ...9 
To illustrate this, suppose I wish to describe a particular book that is sitting on my desk 
(it happens to be named "Niels Bohr, Collected Works, Volume 6", and it is actually very 
heavy). Now there are three components involved here: first, there is the subject (myself); 
second, there is the object (the book); third, there is the interaction between myself and 
the book. We can describe this last component by means of the light rays that reflect off 
the book and travel through the air into my eyes. Now all three components are logically 
separable, and indeed, that they can be so separated is always assumed in our descriptions 
of physical phenomena. Now suppose, for example, that the book is not actually on my 
desk, but underwater, and I am standing on the shore. In this case the book will appear 
to be displaced from its actual position due to the refraction of the light wave through 
a second medium (the water). Now I am able to make the necessary corrections in this 
case. I know about the laws for the refraction of light (or at least I am aware of them), 
and taking these into account, I am able to determine, for instance, the actual position of 
the book with reasonable certainty. In both cases, in order to give a precise description 
of this book, it was necessary to separate and describe the three components: subject, 
object, and their interaction. In the first case we needed to do this in order to show that the 
book actually is where it appears to be, and in the second case, to show that it is not. In 
quantum mechanics, however, it is impossible to actually describe the interaction between 
9Bohr 1928,580. 
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the measuring instrument and the electron.10 It is, of course, possible to describe the overall 
quantum system using wave or matrix mechanics - but this description of the system is not 
one in which subject and object can be distinguished. 
All physical description presupposes that there is something to be described; it pre-
supposes an interaction between subject and object in which all three aspects can be dis-
tinguished. But if such a distinction is impossible in quantum mechanics, then strictly 
speaking the 'classical' concepts: space, time, and causality are inapplicable. But we 
nonetheless require these concepts, for Bohr, in order to conceptualize our experiments; 
we need them to interpret our experience and to communicate this experience; they are, in 
a certain sense, 'a priori' concepts. 
... the requirement of communicability of the circumstances and results of ex-
periments implies that we can speak of well defined experiences only within 
the framework of ordinary concepts. In particular it should not be forgotten 
that the concept of causality underlies the very interpretation of each result of 
experiment, and that even in the coordination of experience one can never, in 
the nature of things, have to do with well-defined breaks in the causal chain. 
The renunciation of the ideal of causality in atomic physics which has been 
forced on us is founded logically only on our not being any longer in a position 
to speak of the autonomous behavior of a physical object, due to the unavoid-
able interaction between the object and the measuring instruments which in 
principle cannot be taken into account, if these instruments according to their 
purpose shall allow the unambiguous use of the concepts necessary for the 
description of experience.'' 
In order to describe the electron at all we must presuppose that the electron is an object 
to be described, i.e., that it is something that can be determined with regard to space and 
time and with regard to its interaction with other objects. For example, if an electron leaves 
a mark on a photographic plate, then we must interpret this as a mark left by an object that 
interacted with the plate in a specific area, i.e., in space and time. Similarly, the interac-
tion between the measuring instrument and the object must itself be described causally -
,0Cf. Bohr 1928,585, 586. 
"Bohr 1937, 293. 
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as a transfer of energy and momentum. Now the uncertainty relations tell us that neither 
of these (position and momentum) can be determined accurately without foregoing a pre-
cise determination of the other. Thus it is impossible in principle to obtain a determinate 
conception of atomic phenomena. But ironically, it is the uncertainty relations themselves 
which enable us to go about our merry way and continue doing physics. For by means of 
the uncertainty relations, we can act in certain circumstances 'as i f the phenomena under 
investigation were a wave: when we wish to determine its momentum, and in certain cir-
cumstances 'as i f it were a particle: when we wish to determine its position. In reality, 
however, if the phenomena under investigation were a particle, // could not be also a wave, 
and vice versa. The two descriptions are mutually contradictory. But since we cannot deter-
mine the electron fully, apart from its interaction with the measuring apparatus, the electron 
is not a determinate object and therefore we are justified in using either description of it; 
both descriptions can be thought of as complementary; for they both serve us in our effort 
to interpret and communicate the results of different experiments. These descriptions can 
be thought of as abstractions, or idealizations - not strictly speaking applicable, but usable 
and necessary. 
From the above considerations it should be clear that the whole situation in 
atomic physics deprives of all meaning such inherent attributes as the ideal-
izations of classical physics would ascribe to the object. On the contrary, the 
proper role of the indeterminacy relations consists in assuring quantitatively 
the logical compatibility of apparently contradictory laws which appear when 
we use two different experimental arrangements, of which only one permits an 
unambiguous use of the concept of position, while only the other permits the 
application of the concept of momentum ...13 
But coming back to the question of scientific explanation: if Bohr's view is that it is 
necessary to speak in the language of classical physics, i.e., in terms of space, time, and 
causality, then isn't this just a vindication of the view that I have been arguing against? 
I2See also: Camilleri 2005, 274. 
13Bohr 1937,293. See also Bohr 1928,581. 
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No, this is not the case; for first, on that view the causal laws must be true laws: they must 
describe physically real interactions between objectively real entities - whether we consider 
these entities to be point-like particles or causal processes. But since, on the Copenhagen 
interpretation it is strictly speaking impossible to speak of the object of investigation, the 
causal interactions we describe are not strictly speaking true, since they are based on a 
strictly speaking false description of what we observe. Second, with regard to position 
measurements, since we cannot determine the momentum of the 'object', we cannot de-
scribe this 'object', even falsely, in terms of its causal interaction with other objects at all. 
For a determination of the 'particle' in terms of space and time foregoes a determination 
of it in terms of its causal interactions. Thus with regard to the description of the results 
of certain experiments an appeal to causes is strictly speaking false (though still useful and 
moreover necessary), and with regard to certain other experiments it is absent entirely. 
Indeed this circumstance presents us with a situation concerning the analysis 
and synthesis of experience which is entirely new in physics and forces us 
to replace the ideal of causality by a more general viewpoint usually termed 
"complementarity." The apparently incompatible sorts of information about 
the behaviour of the object under examination which we get by different ex-
perimental arrangements can clearly not be brought into connection with each 
other in the usual way, but may, as equally essential for an exhaustive account 
of all experience, be regarded as "complementary" to each other.14 
But one may wonder, now, what all the fuss is about; i.e., one may wonder why we 
should view ourselves as limited by these classical concepts. Perhaps quantum mechanics 
requires a new conceptual framework altogether. Cassirer, for example, expresses this 
sentiment when he writes: 
We must face squarely the new problems thus created. There seems to be no 
return to the lost paradise of classical concepts; physics has to undertake the 
construction of a new methodological path. I do not wish to claim at all that 
the end of this path is already clearly in sight. But the direction in which the 
Bohr 1937, 291. 
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solution is to be found seems to me clearly recognizable. Physics and episte-
mology cannot continue to posit a being with full realization that it contradicts 
the conditions of physical knowledge. If it appears that certain concepts, such 
as those of position, of velocity, or of the mass of an individual electron can no 
longer be filled with a definite empirical content, we have to exclude them from 
the theoretical system of physics, important and fruitful though their function 
may have been.15 
Indeed, it certainly is possible to describe atomic phenomena by means of the math-
ematical formalism of either wave or matrix mechanics. Why must we insist on hanging 
on to the old language? Bohr points out, however, that the situation is analogous to that 
in the special theory of relativity: "the fundamental constants, the velocity of light and the 
quantum of action, are introduced into the formalism as factors of the \/^l, the one in the 
definition of the fourth coordinate, the other in the commutation laws of canonically conju-
gate variables. ... in these fields the logical correlations can only be won by a far-reaching 
renunciation of the usual demands of visualization."16 For Bohr, while the mathematical 
formalism is critical for an analysis of our experience in the atomic domain, the synthesis 
of that experience: the connection of different experiences by which we comprehend and 
communicate these experiences, requires that we use ordinary concepts.17 
3.3 Kantian Aspects of Complementarity 
Anyone familiar with Kant's philosophy will have immediately recognized some strik-
ing similarities in the arguments of these two thinkers. Kant makes use of something anal-
ogous to Bohr's 'principle of complementarity' often in his own philosophy. It is, in fact, 
his doctrine of the antinomies: a method for showing that two seemingly contradictory 
arguments are either both false or both compatible. In the latter case, Kant's resolution 
always consists in showing that the thesis and antithesis of the antinomy, though contradic-
15Cassirer [1936] 1956, 194-195. 
l6Bohr 1937,292. 
17Cf.Bohr 1937. 292-293. 
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tory when considered as pertaining to things as they are in themselves, are compatible if 
we consider them as applying merely to things as they appear to us. 
If one regards the two propositions, that the world is infinite in magnitude and 
that the world is finite in magnitude, as opposed to each other contradictorily, 
then one assumes that the world (the entire series of appearances) is a thing 
in itself. For in either proposition the world remains, whether I annul in the 
series of its appearances the infinite or the finite regression. But if I remove 
this presupposition - or i.e. this transcendental illusion - and deny that the 
world is a thing in itself, then the contradictory conflict of the two assertions is 
transformed into a merely dialectical one ...l8 
Such a twofold side from which to think the power of an object of the senses 
contradicts none of the concepts that we have to frame of appearances and of a 
possible experience. For since these appearances are not in themselves things, 
they must be based on a transcendental object determining them as mere pre-
sentations; and hence nothing prevents us from attributing to this transcenden-
tal object, besides the property through which it appears, also a causality that is 
not appearance although its effect is nonetheless encountered in appearance.19 
Now, to show that this antinomy rests on a mere illusion and that nature at least 
does not conflict with the causality from freedom - this was the only goal that 
we were able to accomplish, and it was, moreover, our one and only concern.20 
Now it is certainly not my intention to affix to Bohr the label of 'Kantian'; Bohr's phi-
losophy was in many ways completely unique. Moreover, Bohr did not actually explicitly 
refer to Kant very much, either in his published or unpublished writings. On the other 
hand, his education did occur at a time in which Neo-Kantianism in general was in the 
ascendency. But as interesting as this question is, it is not my intention to engage in an his-
torical analysis of the extent to which Bohr was or was not directly or indirectly influenced 
by Kant in his overall thinking. While such an historical analysis certainly has its merits,21 
my aim is only to show that there are similarities with respect to the central doctrines of 
18Kant [1781/1787] 1996, B532-533. 
19Kant [1781/1787] 1996, B566-567. 
20Kant [1781/1787] 1996,586. 
2,For some points of view on this matter, see, for example: Folse 1978, Howard 2004, Honner 1982, 
Camilleri 2005, Camilleri 2007. 
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these two thinkers which can help us to understand the both of them better, and which are 
relevant to the explanation of atomic phenomena. 
It is often said that quantum mechanics, because it abrogates the law of causality, or be-
cause it entails irreducibly probabilistic phenomena, refutes (or at least contradicts) Kant. It 
does not do so, however - at least not in essentials - if we follow the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion. Kant distinguishes between mathematical and dynamical principles for the possibility 
of experience.22 The former are constitutive for appearances. They are necessary principles 
for the possibility of presenting an appearance to ourselves as existing. According to these 
principles, in order for anything to appear to us, it must be apprehended as having both an 
extensive (length, breadth, etc.) and an intensive magnitude (i.e., a degree). The dynamical 
principles, on the other hand, are not constitutive but merely regulative.23 They are princi-
ples not for the apprehension, but for the connection of appearances in time; therefore they 
presuppose that an appearance already exists (i.e., that it has already been apprehended in 
accordance with the mathematical principles). These dynamical principles are, first, that 
all change presupposes something that is permanent (in the language of physics, we might 
call this the principle of conservation of matter). Second, all changes must occur according 
to the law of cause and effect. Third, all substances that are perceived as simultaneous are 
in mutual interaction. 
Now since the dynamical principles are merely regulative (i.e., since they are only valid 
with regard to actually existing appearances), that something appears must be presupposed 
in order for a time determination of it according to the dynamical principles to be possi-
ble. But that something appears to us as existing is, by itself, not enough to determine 
this something as an object. To determine this appearance as an object, we must apply the 
dynamical principles to it. We must say that, at a determinate instant of time, it has a deter-
22Kant [1781/1787] 1996, B198-B294. 
23This sense of regulative should not be confused with the sense that Kant uses with respect to the 'ideas of 
reason'. There the distinction is between that which is constitutive or regulative with respect to experience as 
a whole. Here, he uses regulative not in the context of experience in general, but in the context of particular 
objects of experience. 
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minate position in space (determined by the mathematical principles) and that there is a law 
(subject to the dynamical principles) by which it dynamically interacts with other objects. 
Now consider atomic phenomena. By means of the mark, say, on a photographic plate, we 
are able to determine that something, which we conceptualize as a particle, exists, and that 
it interacted with the plate at such-and-such a place - but by means of this experiment we 
cannot in principle determine it with regard to its momentum; in other words we cannot 
determine its dynamical interaction with the plate. Similarly we can, by means of another 
experiment, determine the momentum of this something if we conceptualize it as a wave 
that is unlimited in extent; but by doing so we forego any determination of this something 
as existing determinately at a definite position. Since atomic phenomena cannot be simul-
taneously determined with regard to the mathematical and dynamical principles, both of 
which are required for the determination of an object, atomic phenomena simply are not 
objects in the everyday sense of the term, and both the wave and particle descriptions are, 
strictly speaking, false if we take them as being applicable to atomic phenomena as they 
are in themselves. It is no surprise at all, then, that according to the precise mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics, we are unable to distinguish object from measuring in-
strument - for there is no object to distinguish - not, that is, in the sense that we are capable 
of understanding something as an object. And it is no surprise at all that the principle of 
causality does not apply to these phenomena. 
In Kant's language, we would call these 'objects' noumena, and it is because they are 
noumena that we can apply abstractions such as a wave or a particle description to them 
without fear of contradiction, so long as we do not understand these descriptions to be 
applicable to them as they are in themselves. To clarify: according to Kant, a concept 
of the understanding must be understood both in terms of its form and in terms of the 
content to which it can be applied. We can think of the form of a concept as analogous to 
a mathematical function, e.g., f(x) = 2x + 4. Now a determinate result can be obtained 
for this function only if something is filled in for x. By itself, the function only represents 
76 
a form for the determination of a variable. Likewise for a concept: without content, a 
concept gives us no determinate cognition. "Without an object the concept has no sense 
and is completely empty of content, although it may still contain the logical function for 
making a concept from what data may come up".24 
For the case of the mathematical function, the only allowable values of x (i.e., the do-
main of x) are numbers. Thus, / (5) is defined but / ( ' A ' ) is not. Now the concept of a 
noumenon (in the negative sense of the term) is the concept of something indeterminate. It 
is analogous to x in the mathematical equation. The function above cannot be applied to x 
itself, but only to a value that has been filled in for x. Similarly for concepts: they cannot 
be applied to an indeterminate intuition but only to a determinate one. But now consider 
atomic phenomena. Because we are unable - in principle according to the Copenhagen in-
terpretation - to make a distinction between the object being measured and the instrument 
doing the measuring, we cannot represent this object determinately as existing outside 'our-
selves' (i.e., the measuring instrument). Therefore we cannot think of the appearance of 
the elementary particle as the appearance of a determinate something existing, in the strict 
sense of that word, and therefore the dynamical principles: permanence, causality, simul-
taneity, etc. - those principles stemming from the concepts of our understanding which 
determine the appearance in time - simply cannot be applied to it. Atomic phenomena are 
problematic concepts: 
I call a concept problematic if, although containing no contradiction and also 
cohering with other cognitions as a boundary of given concepts involved in 
them, its objective reality cannot be cognized in any way. The concept of 
noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought at all as an object of the 
senses but is to be thought (solely through a pure understanding) as a thing 
in itself, is not at all contradictory; for we cannot, after all, assert of sensi-
bility that it is the only possible kind of intuition. Moreover, the concept of 
a noumenon is necessary in order not to extend sensible intuition even over 
things in themselves, and hence in order to limit the objective validity ofsensi-
24Kant [1781/1787] 1996, B298. 
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ble cognition. 
Thus if one considers an electron as it is in itself- a concept for which we can have no 
sensible intuition - then the wave and particle descriptions are indeed contradictory. But if 
one considers only the appearances resulting from our experiments - and these are given 
in space and time - then these descriptions are compatible, i.e., they are complementary 
descriptions of what we observe. 
Now Kant held these 'classical' concepts to be absolutely a priori - necessary concepts 
for a rational being as such. I do not wish to argue for or against this view here, but I will 
note that there appears to be nothing barring us from 'relativizing' Kant's conception of the 
a priori. It is not clear what Bohr's opinions on this were, however this was Heisenberg's 
view: "... the Kantian 'a priori' is indirectly connected with experience in so far as it has 
been formed through the development of the human mind in a very distant past. ... It is in 
fact quite plausible that for certain primitive animals space and time are different from what 
Kant calls our 'pure intuitions' of space and time."26 And also: "We should nevertheless 
remember that the very structure of human thought changes in the course of historical 
development. Science progresses not only because it helps to explain newly discovered 
facts, but also because it teaches us over and over again what the word 'understanding' 
may mean."27 
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is certainly not the only available 
interpretation of atomic phenomena on offer. Although it was for a long time, the only in-
terpretation taught to physics students, in recent years additional interpretations have been 
proposed. Two such examples are the de-Broglie-Bohm theory and Popper's propensity 
theory.28 Now I do not intend to engage in a detailed discussion of the relative merits and 
shortcomings of each of these interpretations. It is enough, for my limited purposes, to 
25Kant [1781/1787] 1996, B310. Emphasis added. 
26Heisenbergl959,83. 
27Heisenberg 1971,124. 
28For some of the criticisms of the Copenhagen interpretation and some alternative interpretations, see: 
Einstein et. al. 1935, Popper 1982, Bunge 1955, Bunge 1955a, Bohm 1957, Baggott 2004. For Bohr's 
response to Einstein, see: Bohr 1935 and Bohr 1949. 
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point out that the Copenhagen interpretation presents us with a non-causal explanation of 
atomic phenomena, and importantly: quantum mechanics is not some trivial exception to 
the rule of causal explanations in science; it is the most successful theory in physics. 
3.4 Probabilistic Causality, Causal Processes, and Reduc-
tionism 
Let us return now to some of the questions that we left open earlier in this thesis, and 
consider whether anything we have discussed in this chapter can help to shed some light on 
them. Before we do, however, let me reiterate that my intention was clearly not to present 
an argument for the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. I have 
not provided anything like a defence of this interpretation against the criticisms levelled 
at it by some. Rather, I have simply taken it for granted that this theory which for close 
to a century has enjoyed such widespread acceptance, accounted for every experimental 
result, and withstood the many thought experiments and actual experiments designed to 
refute it, can tell us something about the subject of scientific explanation. It is, after all, the 
most successful theory in physics. Philosophy is not a popularity contest, however, and we 
should never appeal to consensus when we can appeal to sound argument instead. Thus I 
will leave it open whether or not the Copenhagen interpretation is actually correct. Assum-
ing that it is, however (and the burden of proof is not on it), what can quantum mechanics 
tell us about the questions of probabilistic causality, causal processes, and reductionism, as 
they relate to the question of scientific explanation? 
Let us begin with probabilistic causes, which we discussed in chapter 2. First, I think 
that we need to distinguish between probabilistic processes that are reducible in principle 
to deterministic ones, and those that are not. With regard to the latter we can say that 
these all belong to the domain of atomic physics. This, I take it, is uncontroversial, and 
according to the dominant interpretation of atomic physics the principle of causality cannot 
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strictly speaking be applied to these processes at all. Thus if we accept the Copenhagen 
interpretation (as Railton purports to do), then there is no need to appeal to propensities in 
order to interpret these probabilities causally, indeed such an interpretation of probability 
would seem to actually contradict the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
As for probabilistic processes that are reducible in principle to deterministic processes, 
I think it indeed makes sense to speak of 'probabilistic causes' in these cases - so long as 
we only consider probability to be a good indicator of an underlying deterministic mech-
anism and do not view these probabilities as themselves explicating the notion of a causal 
link.29 Recall that on the model of explanation that I have been defending (the D-N-P), the 
requirement is that we always explain reducibly probabilistic processes deterministically. 
Thus an ideal explanatory text for an apparently probabilistic process would not contain 
any probabilistic laws at all. We could still appeal to reducibly probabilistic laws in an 
explanation, however, and on the D-N-P model, via Railton's notion of explanatory infor-
mation, such an explanation would be perfectly valid so long as these laws are seen merely 
as approximations. 
Let us now turn to the characterization of causal processes themselves, and specifically 
to the debate between Salmon and Dowe. Recall that Dowe characterized a causal process 
as the world line of an object which possesses a conserved quantity.30 Salmon, recall, 
criticized Dowe on the grounds that some objects (e.g., the portion of a wall illuminated 
by a spotlight as the spotlight moves back and forth) satisfy Dowe's conserved quantity 
criterion but nevertheless do not qualify as causal processes because they cannot transmit 
energy. Dowe responded that such an object as the illuminated spot on a wall cannot qualify 
as an object for it is not something that wholly exists in time, to which Salmon responded 
that 'wholly existing at a time' begs the question of the explication of genidentity (identity 
over time). 
Now if we believe Bohr then we should side with Dowe here. For according to Bohr, 
29On the irreducibility of causes to probabilities, see Cartwright 1989,22-38. 
30Cf. Above. 
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the concept of causality is simply not applicable unless we can distinguish an object; and 
an object, on this view, is exactly what Dowe describes it to be: something that is 'wholly 
present at a time'. As for the issue of genidentity, this is a non sequitur. An object is 
whatever we, for pragmatic reasons, take it to be - just so long as whatever we define it to 
be can be determined both in and across time. In quantum mechanics also, the line that we 
draw between measuring instrument and 'object' is always arbitrary: we must always draw 
this line if we are to communicate our experiences of atomic phenomena, but we always 
draw it so that it is most convenient for our purposes. 
As for the question of reductionism which we discussed at the end of chapter 1,1 think 
the answer is clear that according the Copenhagen interpretation the reductionist thesis 
should be rejected. According to Bohr's principle of complementarity, the 'object' of in-
vestigation must, as we have seen, necessarily be characterized according to two mutually 
incompatible but complementary descriptions. Further, he writes: 
Just the fact that the paradoxes of atomic physics could be solved not by a one 
sided attitude towards the old problem of "determinism or indeterminism," but 
only by examining the possibilities of observation and definition, should rather 
stimulate us to a renewed examination of the position in this respect in the 
biological and psychological problems at issue. ... The only logical possibility 
of avoiding any contradiction between the formulation of the laws of physics 
and the concepts suitable for the description of the phenomena of life ought 
therefore to be sought in the essentially different character of the conditions of 
investigation concerned.31 
Bohr never pursued this line of thought, unfortunately; however his sentiments here are 
strikingly similar to Kant's, and Kant indeed has both an ethical and a biological theory 
grounded on something very similar to Bohr's principle of complementarity. If Bohr's 
principle of complementarity and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics 
can be defended it is but one more argument for a non-reductionist, Kantian-inspired view 
of ethics and biology. If Bohr and Kant are right, then we are completely justified in 
3IBohr 1937, 295. 
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denying to Railton that there can be only one ideal text for any event, and instead holding 
that can be many, perhaps as many as one per special science. 
But suppose the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is incorrect (recall 
that I have not defended it). In this case we should not be worried, for the model of ex-
planation that I have defended is perfectly compatible with a propensity interpretation of 
probability; it is perfectly compatible with a reductionist view of science, and it is perfectly 
compatible with a causal interpretation of irreducibly probabilistic processes. But of course 
it is, for these are Railton's own views. 
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Conclusion 
Railton's D-N-P model begins with Hempel's D-N model but has the advantage that 
it makes room for - indeed, it stresses - some of our intuitions concerning causal cases. 
Further, his distinction between an ideal explanatory text and explanatory information al-
lows us to take pragmatic considerations into account when evaluating explanations. The 
requirement to give a full account of the mechanism giving rise to the explanandum is 
enough to deal with both the irrelevance and asymmetry counter-examples. Railton's D-N-
P model is, I think, the most promising model of singular explanation yet put forward. Yet 
an account of explanation should make as few metaphysical commitments as possible. A 
commitment to hard reductionism or to the propensity interpretation of probability has no 
place, and I believe that I have shown how Railton's D-N-P model can function perfectly 
well without them. 
The modified version of the D-N-P model that I have defended in this thesis is neutral 
with respect to the issue of reductionism, with respect to the interpretation of probability, 
and with respect to a causal characterization of irreducibly probabilistic processes. In chap-
ter 1,1 argued that Railton's requirement that there be one and only one ideal explanatory 
text for an event should be dropped; in chapter 2,1 argued that there was no need to appeal 
to a propensity interpretation of probability in order to account for irreducibly probabilistic 
processes; and throughout, I have been arguing that an account of scientific explanation 
that focuses solely on causes is incomplete. In chapter 3, finally, I showed how the denial 
of all of these views is compatible with our modern physical theories. 
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Kolmogorov's highly successful axiomatization of the probability calculus is, for me, 
an excellent example of the type of approach that I believe is best suited for an account 
of explanation. Although Kolmogorov's own views on probability are frequentist, his ax-
iomatization makes no assumptions and takes no interpretation of prior probabilities for 
granted. Its success is a witness to what can be achieved when we focus on the issue at 
hand. An account of explanation should not attempt to solve all the problems extant in the 
philosophy of science - only the ones with which we are concerned. 
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